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Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles 
in Settlement 
ELLEN E. DEASON* 
Settlement is prevalent, and crucial to the functioning of the U.S. 
judicial system. But the pretrial regulatory framework in the courts is 
largely discretionary, and its emphasis on management does not fully 
take into account all the consequences of combining settlement with 
adjudication. The label “managerial judge” does not differentiate 
between the functions involved in managing a settlement process and 
the very different role of serving as a settlement neutral. By 
introducing this distinction, this Article provides a framework for 
analyzing settlement that focuses on the conflicts between a judge’s 
role as a neutral in settlement and as a neutral in adjudication. 
 
This Article argues for reform that would prevent judges assigned to a 
case for pretrial management and trial from serving as the neutral at 
a settlement conference or judicial mediation. The proposal to 
separate these roles structurally would address the problems of 
coercion and partiality that can result from a dual-neutral role, while 
retaining the contributions of settlement judges. The proposal is 
informed by the history of judges’ involvement in settlement, and by 
their increasing reliance on mediation techniques. It draws on 
principles that are already recognized in some local and state ADR 
rules and rests on modern understandings of cognitive functioning and 
decisionmaking that should be incorporated into our thinking about 
frameworks for settlement.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In U.S. courts, judicial efforts to aid settlement are usually thought of as 
an element of pretrial management. This conception dates back to the 
identification of a “managerial” role for judges,1 although its roots reach even 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in 
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981) (approving the 
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earlier, to the inclusion of settlement in pretrial conferences. In her influential 
1982 article, Managerial Judges, Professor Judith Resnik contrasted the 
judge’s traditional role in adjudication—making decisions based on 
information presented by the parties in motions and at trials, with justifications 
in the form of reasoned explanations2—with that of the “judge-overseer.”3 
Pretrial, a managerial judge is engaged in supervising discovery, managing 
case development, and encouraging settlement.4 Professor Resnik famously 
questioned the wisdom of the increase in judicial authority associated with 
these “judge initiated, invisible, and unreviewable” roles5 due to the absence 
of procedural safeguards to protect parties from abuse of that authority.6 Her 
critique of the emergence of managerial judging, and of the shift in judicial 
focus from trial to pretrial proceedings, ushered in an era of debate about the 
role of judges among both academic observers and judges themselves.  
This Article builds on insights from that debate, but proposes a different 
analytical structure for examining judicial settlement activities and the rules 
that govern them. This framework is based on the insight that judges perform 
two very different functions in settlement. Their first role is truly managerial: 
helping the parties plan for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and select an 
appropriate process. Their second role is that of a neutral: helping to resolve 
the dispute by direct involvement as a third party who leads a settlement 
process. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently 
contemplates both roles and blends them in its authorization, and many local 
and state rules follow the same pattern.7 The debate spawned by Professor 
Resnik’s article similarly treats all of settlement as an aspect of management. 
Yet, although both settlement and management take place pretrial, acting as a 
settlement neutral is conceptually and functionally distinct from managing the 
settlement of a case and the other pretrial managerial duties authorized by Rule 
16.  
Recognizing this distinction enables a fresh consideration of the issue of 
judges who act as settlement neutrals in cases in which they are the assigned 
judicial officer. A dual judicial role that encompasses both attempting to settle 
cases and adjudication has been condemned (and defended) before, in the 
context of criticisms of pretrial managerial judging.8 Unlike these earlier 
                                                                                                                     
role); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (criticizing the 
role). 
 2 Resnik, supra note 1, at 378 n.13. 
 3 Id. at 379. 
 4 Resnik also examined the managerial judge’s posttrial role in monitoring remedies, 
especially in public law litigation, but concluded that pretrial supervision represents the 
sharper break from the norms of American adjudication. Id. at 414. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 380. 
 7 See infra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
 8 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1, at 435 (suggesting that the judge who will preside at 
trial should not try to settle the case). 
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criticisms, however, I do not object either to judicial pretrial management or to 
judicial involvement with settlement in general. Pretrial judicial management 
by the judge assigned for trial is a deeply ingrained (and, in many ways, 
effective) aspect of procedure.9 And judges often serve effectively as 
settlement neutrals—traditionally in judicial settlement conferences and more 
recently as mediators—and can make significant contributions in this role.  
Judges’ truly managerial functions related to settlement—encouraging 
parties to settle and helping them plan a process—are consistent with the 
primary thrust of Rule 16 to improve the efficiency and quality of litigation as 
a case moves toward a disposition. However, a problem arises when a judge 
who is assigned to preside as adjudication neutral also serves as a neutral to 
facilitate settlement. These two roles are not only distinct, but incompatible. 
The problems become clearer when the roles are conceptualized as two neutral 
roles—settlement and decisionmaking—rather than as merely adding a 
managerial function to the judge’s traditional role of adjudication.  
Some judges refuse this dual role based on their personal convictions. Yet 
in most jurisdictions this is a matter of discretion, not prohibited by rule, and 
there is ample evidence that it is not uncommon for judges to assume both 
roles in the same case. This Article demonstrates how new understandings of 
decisionmaking processes reinforce longstanding doubts about combining 
these roles. It argues that the practice raises such troubling implications for 
party self-determination in settlement, and for the integrity of the adjudicatory 
process, that the rules should be amended to prohibit the practice. 
In Part II, this Article draws on contemporary judicial writing and 
empirical studies to trace judicial involvement in settlement conferences 
through four developmental stages. These stages were accompanied by 
amendments to Rule 16 that endorsed expanded judicial roles and discretion. 
Although today the federal rules impose few limits on judicial roles related to 
settlement, this history reveals that the concerns underlying the separation 
proposed in this Article have deep, historical roots.  
Part III explores the benefits of judicial settlement, and the conflicts that 
result from mixing the role of settlement neutral with the judicial role of 
adjudication (both pretrial and as the presiding judge at trial) as currently 
permitted by Rule 16, the majority of local federal rules, and many state rules. 
The conflicts in neutral roles stem from two primary sources. One is the 
potential for coercion that undermines the important value of party self-
determination in settlement. The other is the dilemma that requires attorneys to 
make a choice between guarding information that would improve the prospects 
for settlement or sharing it with the judge and potentially undermining the 
integrity of the adjudication process. These concerns are strengthened by 
modern understandings of cognitive processes, which suggest multiple flaws 
                                                                                                                     
 9 See generally Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the 
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669 (2010) (discussing amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that validate and encourage active judicial pretrial case management). 
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in a structure that allows settlement neutrals to be decisionmaking neutrals. In 
a day when the limitations of human decisionmaking processes are common 
knowledge, these concepts should be reflected in the way we organize our 
settlement processes.  
Part IV examines possibilities for limiting the effects of these conflicting 
neutral roles. It draws examples from local federal court rules and state law 
and identifies ways in which some jurisdictions apply principles that draw a 
distinction between managing settlement in the context of court-connected 
ADR programs and serving as a neutral in settlement. This Article argues that 
procedural rules should use these same principles to structure the permissible 
roles of judges in all settlement processes, including settlement conferences. 
Limiting judicial discretion is necessary to avoid the problems that occur when 
a judicial officer who is assigned the adjudicative role also takes an active role 
as settlement neutral. 
Granted, coercion is to some degree inherent in judicial encouragement of 
settlement, and concerns about bias run through the litigation process. There 
are two reasons, however, why it is important to attack these problems in the 
settlement context. First, these problems are especially acute when an 
adjudicatory/managerial judge serves as settlement judge. In terms of 
coercion, the potential is heightened when parties who do not settle will return 
to the settlement judge for trial. In terms of impartiality, judges gain far more 
information that can affect their judgments in settlement than they do in the 
ordinary course of management and adjudication. Significantly, this 
information is different in kind from that which judges learn in the context of 
motions and evidentiary rulings.  
Second, there is a manageable solution. This Article proposes that Rule 
16, local federal rules, and state rules should prohibit assigned judges from 
serving as settlement judges and limit the information that the settlement 
neutral may provide to the adjudicatory/managing neutral about the settlement 
process. If the rules recognize that serving as a settlement neutral is distinct 
from management and needs to be structurally isolated from adjudication, then 
settlement, management, and adjudication all will benefit from parties’ 
increased confidence in the judicial system. 
II. THE CO-EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND RULE 16 
The evolution of judicial pretrial settlement practices in the federal district 
courts is a story of expansion: both in the roles of individual judges and in the 
operational roles of courts as institutions. The authorization for this activity in 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has generally followed, rather 
than led, the developments in settlement practices.10 Overall, amendments to 
                                                                                                                     
 10 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s note on 1983 amend. (stating 
that the amendment “recognizes that it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at 
pretrial conferences”); Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?—The Need for a 
Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 52 (1994) (stating the 1993 
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Rule 16 have recognized the expanding reality of judicial pretrial practices, 
endorsing and making more explicit the district courts’ pretrial management 
powers. This has been especially true of the amendments concerning 
settlement, which have pragmatically codified judicial trends and court 
innovations. These amendments have reflected the increasing attention paid to 
judicial settlement since the inception of the Federal Rules in 1938 and the 
changes in legal culture that have, in many districts, institutionalized court-
sponsored settlement processes as a normal element of litigation.  
Pretrial proceedings are largely committed to judges’ discretion; Rule 16’s 
current regulatory structure for settlement is primarily permissive, not limiting. 
The Rule not only grants judges great discretion in how they approach 
settlement in a particular case, but also accepts significant diversity in the local 
structures within which that discretion is exercised.11 This diversity is 
consistent with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 199812: while that 
Act requires district courts to provide some form of ADR process, it also gives 
them extensive leeway to select and structure the processes they offer to suit 
local conditions. As a result, court-sponsored settlement varies greatly among 
the districts and, inevitably, some courts have surpassed others in terms of the 
scope and quality of their dispute resolution program.  
This Part draws on judicial writings and contemporary studies to identify 
four stages in the evolution of judicial settlement practices. Part II.A describes 
the period immediately following the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules, 
when Rule 16 did not recognize settlement as a pretrial judicial activity. 
Judges who held pretrial conferences tended to restrain themselves in 
discussing settlement with attorneys and, under the prevailing case assignment 
systems, those judges who were active in settlement rarely tried the case. This 
general restraint gave way during the 1960s and especially the 1970s to a 
second stage of development, outlined in Part II.B. It was marked by the 
growth of managerial judging and increasing judicial enthusiasm for 
promoting settlement. Pretrial settlement conferences became widespread, and 
they were eventually endorsed in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16. Stage 
three, which is detailed in Part II.C, was characterized by the establishment of 
court-sponsored ADR programs. Judges continued to hold settlement 
conferences, but options for settlement processes broadened and judges 
assumed additional managerial roles in settlement, which varied greatly due to 
the local nature of ADR programs. These changes were recognized in 1993 
with further amendments to Rule 16. Part II.D presents evidence of a fourth, 
ongoing stage in which mediation has become an increasingly important part 
of judicial settlement. Judges have begun to mediate, and mediation techniques 
have influenced how many judges conduct their settlement conferences.  
                                                                                                                     
amendment “again provides explicit authorization in the rules for what many judges are 
already doing”). 
 11 See infra notes 84–92 and accompanying text; see also infra note 157.  
 12 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2012). 
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For the most part, the discretion allowed to each judge to determine his or 
her preferred role in settlement has expanded through these evolutionary 
stages. Today, litigants may experience a wide range of court-connected 
settlement activity, which includes both judges performing managerial 
functions and judges presiding as neutrals. Rule 16 currently authorizes both 
these roles with little limitation. It is noteworthy, however, that even as 
discretion with regard to settlement has expanded over the decades, concerns 
with one potential consequence—conflicting judicial roles—have echoed 
repeatedly through each stage of the evolution of judicially-led settlement.  
A. Stage 1: General Judicial Restraint in Settlement and Rule 16 
Silence 
The inaugural version of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that merged 
law and equity in 1938 did not mention settlement. The Rules contributed 
major innovations in the form of liberal rules of pleading and joinder13 and 
provisions for information exchange through discovery to develop cases prior 
to trial14 that, along with a decline in the rate of trials, made the pretrial phase 
the “main event” in litigation.15 The rulemakers, inspired by the practice of 
some state court judges, also added Rule 16 to authorize pretrial conferences.16 
                                                                                                                     
 13 The pleading and joinder rules eased access to the courts and permitted lawsuits 
with a broader scope. See, e.g., Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 267–68, 270–74 (1939); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of 
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439–
40 (1986); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 494, 521 (1986). 
 14 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical 
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998) (discussing 
the influence of the 1938 Rules on increased potential for discovery).  
 15 Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 
1589 (2003). 
 16 Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 
JUDICATURE 257, 258 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses 
and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 490–91 
(1986); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 935 (2000); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look 
at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1973–74 (1989).  
The Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan (where Detroit is located) is credited as 
the first to institutionalize the pretrial format in the United States. Alexander Holtzoff, 
Pretrial Procedure: Report of the Committee to the Judicial Conference for the District of 
Columbia, 1 F.R.D. 759, 759 (1941). The court was initially motivated to relieve 
congestion in its docket of lien cases that resulted from a building boom in the 1920s but, 
based on its success, it expanded the practice to the law side of the docket and made it 
compulsory in all cases. Ira W. Jayne, Foreword, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 160, 161–62 (1956). 
This pretrial “preview” of cases resulted in “the reduction of issues, settlements, limitations 
of proofs, and early decisions on such issues as required proofs.” Id. at 162 (quoting 
George E. Brand, “Mighty Oaks”—Pretrial, 26 JUDICATURE 36, 37 (1942)). Similar 
procedures were instituted in Cleveland, Milwaukee, and Boston, and also served as 
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Consistent with the overall emphasis on the flexibility of equity traditions in 
the Federal Rules,17 Rule 16 gave district judges discretion to decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether to hold a conference and how to shape it.18 It thus 
encouraged, but did not require, judges to participate in discussion and 
exchange with the parties as a more informal way of narrowing issues for trial 
than reliance on formal pleadings.19  
There was concern among the drafters, however, with the potential for 
coercion of the parties.20 This was reflected in their reluctance to include 
settlement as an appropriate topic for discussion at pretrial conferences. Years 
later, Charles Clark, the influential reporter for the Supreme Court’s Advisory 
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, explained that the omission was 
purposeful and stemmed directly from concerns about coercion: “[I]t is 
dangerous to the whole purpose of pre-trial to force settlement upon unwilling 
                                                                                                                     
models for the federal rulemakers. Galanter, supra, at 258; Holtzoff, supra, at 760; Will 
Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal Judges, 21 DICTA 244, 244 (1944). 
 17 See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
 18 In creating Rule 16, there had been drafting disagreements over whether 
conferences would be limited to jury trials and whether judges would be obliged to hold a 
conference at the request of the parties. These limitations on judicial discretion were 
rejected. Resnik, supra note 16, at 935–36; Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1979. 
 19 Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1978–79, 1981. As adopted in 1938, Rule 16 provided: 
 Rule 16. Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues. 
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to 
appear before it for a conference to consider 
(1) The simplification of the issues; 
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; 
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will 
avoid unnecessary proof; 
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses; 
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings 
to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; 
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.  
 The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, 
the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as 
to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not 
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered 
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent 
manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar 
on which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either 
confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions.  
AM. BAR ASS’N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES 37–38 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938). 
 20 Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1979–80 (citing concerns about judges coercing parties 
by eliminating issues from the case and compelling settlement).  
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parties and to make the conference the recognized instrument of compelled 
negotiations.”21  
Despite the absence of settlement authorization from the language of the 
Rule, judges certainly did settle cases in pretrial conferences in the decades 
immediately following the adoption of the Federal Rules. But tradition 
imposed informal constraints on pretrial activity in general,22 and two factors 
appear to have restrained judicial behavior specifically in terms of settlement 
during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. First, the dominant view in the federal 
courts (at least as reflected in the rhetoric of the day) was that settlement was a 
“by-product” of pretrial conferences, not their primary purpose.23 Second, 
under the prevalent system for assigning cases, the judge conducting the 
conference was typically not the judge assigned for trial.24 
The by-product theory was articulated in recommendations submitted by 
the Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States and 
approved by the Conference in 1944. They stated that the “committee 
consider[ed] that settlement is a by-product of good pre-trial procedure rather 
than a primary objective to be actively pursued by the judge.”25 Settlement at 
pretrial conferences was accepted, however, as “often the logical result of pre-
                                                                                                                     
 21 Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 167 
(1956); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Continuing Education of the Judiciary in 
Improved Procedures (“[W]e must stand steadfastly against the perversion of the pretrial 
procedure into a device for forcing settlements.”), in Proceedings of the Seminar on 
Practice and Procedure Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37, 42, 50 
(1960) [hereinafter Seminar on Practice and Procedure]; Charles E. Clark, To an 
Understanding Use of Pre-Trial (“Compelled settlement negotiations are dangerous as 
bringing in question the impartiality of the tribunal . . . .”), in Proceedings of the Seminar 
on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 454, 456 (1961) 
[hereinafter Seminar on Effective Judicial Administration].  
 22 See Marcus, supra note 15, at 1563 (noting that before the 1970s, “district judges’ 
discretion was constrained by the traditional reticence of the judge during the pretrial 
period”). 
 23 The term “by-product” frequently appears in judicial writing from the time about 
Rule 16. See, e.g., Harry M. Fisher, Pre-Trial Conference and Its By-Products, 1950 U. 
ILL. L.F. 206, 214; Alexander Holtzoff, Federal Pretrial Procedure, 11 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 
29 (1962); Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision over 
Litigation, in Seminar on Effective Judicial Administration, supra note 21, at 207, 215; 
Shafroth, supra note 16, at 252; J. Skelly Wright, Pre-Trial on Trial, 14 LA. L. REV. 391, 
399 (1954); see also Handbook for Effective Pretrial Procedure, 37 F.R.D. 255, 271 
(1964) (statement on pretrial procedure adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States); Harry D. Nims, Some By-Products of Pre-Trial, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 185 (1956). 
 24 See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 25 Alfred P. Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure: A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 
417, 424 (1954). Justice Brennan, addressing the Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit 
in 1960, endorsed this view, asserting that “settlement can never be the reason for the 
[pretrial] conference, but merely an incidental, although, of course, valuable, result of it.” 
Brennan, supra note 21, at 50. 
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trial.”26 Judge Alfred P. Murrah, then-chair of the Pre-Trial Committee, 
expressed the relationship between pretrial and settlement as follows: “By 
narrowing the area of disagreement and pointing out the pitfalls of going to 
trial, the pre-trial judge can thus attempt to clear the way for a settlement 
advantageous to the interests of both parties.”27  
In terms of judicial behavior, contemporary judicial commentary suggests 
widespread consensus that it was appropriate to ask the attorneys whether they 
had considered settlement,28 thereby initiating discussions that attorneys might 
hesitate to start for fear of signaling weakness.29 Some judges thought 
suggesting that attorneys discuss settlement should be the limit of their 
involvement,30 while other judges thought they could go somewhat further 
without overstepping.31 But the by-product theory was inconsistent with 
judges aggressively promoting settlement at the pretrial conference32 and 
empirical evidence from the time suggests that this attitude seems to have 
encouraged restraint.33  
The by-product view was not universally accepted, however, and there 
were disagreements during this period about the appropriate degree of 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Murrah, supra note 25, at 420. The settlement rate could be substantial. In the first 
nine months of conducting pretrial conferences in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, almost 60% of the cases settled at or after the conferences, which were 
conducted shortly before trial. Holtzoff, supra note 16, at 761. 
 27 Murrah, supra note 25, at 420; see also Holtzoff, supra note 23, at 29 (stating that 
at pretrial, counsel “begins to discern the weaknesses of his own side, and to perceive the 
strong points of his adversary’s case,” likely becoming “more amenable and more desirous 
of settlement”). 
 28 See Shafroth, supra note 16, at 250; Wright, supra note 23, at 398. State appellate 
courts also accepted the practice. E.g., Madrigale v. Corrone, 258 A.2d 102, 106 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1968) (urging both counsel to settle was not inappropriate in case in which judge 
did not participate in negotiations); Washington v. Sterling, 91 A.2d 844, 845 (D.C. 1952) 
(stating trial court may suggest the advisability of settlement). 
 29 See, e.g., Murrah, supra note 25, at 420; Edson R. Sunderland, Procedure for 
Pretrial Conferences in the Federal Courts, 3 WYO. L.J. 197, 202 (1949). 
 30 See Grover M. Moscowitz, Glimpses of Federal Trials and Procedure, 4 F.R.D. 
216, 218 (1946) (“If the judge merely suggests to the attorneys that they discuss the 
possibilities of settlement, that should be sufficient impetus from the Court.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Murrah, supra note 25, at 420 (advocating that a judge could “make 
discreet suggestions as to the possible outcome of a trial”). 
 32 See, e.g., William F. Smith, Pretrial Conference—A Study of Methods (noting that 
“judicially supervised ‘haggling’ and efforts to exert pressure are to be cautiously avoided” 
in settlement discussions, which “should not be regarded as a primary objective of the 
pretrial conference”), in Seminar on Effective Judicial Administration, supra note 21, at 
348, 352–53; Wright, supra note 23, at 393 (“It is suggested that pre-trial is a means by 
which a judge coerces lawyers into settlement and thereby avoids the necessity for trial. I 
say to you such is not pre-trial, but a prostitution of the process.”). 
 33 John W. Delehant, The Pre-Trial Conference in Practical Employment: Its Scope 
and Technique, 28 NEB. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1948) (reporting that 80% of federal trial judges 
responding to an ABA survey limited their settlement involvement to inquiring if the 
attorneys had initiated settlement and if they thought it would be appropriate). 
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emphasis on settlement34 with some judges taking an activist stance, 
particularly in state courts.35 This group of judges saw settlement as the 
“primary objective” of pretrial conferences,36 and expressed great enthusiasm 
for the effect of settlement in pretrial conferences in reducing dockets and 
waiting times to trial.37 Among such judges, settlement techniques included 
assessing the value of the case, pointing out strong and weak aspects of the 
claim or defense, and attempting to persuade the parties to settle.38  
                                                                                                                     
 34 See Fisher, supra note 23, at 212 (noting two schools of thought, one of which 
“attaches much higher importance to [the pretrial conference] as a means of bringing about 
settlements”); Stanley M. Ryan & John C. Wickhem, Pre-Trial Practice in Wisconsin 
Courts, 1954 WIS. L. REV. 5, 15–23 (finding several schools of thought on settlement in a 
survey of Wisconsin judges on pretrial conferences); Sunderland, supra note 29, at 203 
(advocating a secondary role for settlement at pretrial conferences but acknowledging a 
“considerable difference of opinion” in its importance); Melvin Belli, Book Review, 76 
YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1967) (reviewing MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964)) (noting the divergent views of New Jersey judges).  
 35 Galanter, supra note 16, at 259–60.  
 36 Ryan & Wickhem, supra note 34, at 15 (emphasis omitted); see also Ross W. 
Shumaker, Appraisal of Pre-Trial in Ohio, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 192, 205 (1956) (stating that 
settlement at pretrial is a controversial subject, but “in Ohio the majority of judges and 
lawyers feel that settlement is not merely a by-product, but one of the most desirable 
objectives, of pre-trial”).  
 37 E.g., Harry M. Fisher, Judicial Mediation: How It Works Through Pre-Trial 
Conference, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 454 (1943) (“The number of cases disposed of under 
the guidance of the pre-trial judge without trial has exceeded the fondest hopes of the 
advocates of the system.”); John W. McIlvaine, The Value of an Effective Pretrial (“[W]ith 
the congested condition of the docket . . . I feel it is incumbent on every judge to use the 
pretrial as an aid in effectuating settlement.”), in Seminar on Practice and Procedure, 
supra note 21, at 158, 162; Ryan & Wickhem, supra note 34, at 15 (reporting that many 
judges “emphasize that unless a large percentage of cases is disposed of by settlement at 
pre-trials, their calendars would become hopelessly backlogged”); Shafroth, supra note 16, 
at 244 (noting that in Detroit and Boston pretrial conferences “succeeded in clearing up 
very bad congestion of the trial calendars”). In contrast, a book from this era on the 
problem of congestion in the courts, AM. ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE 
LAW EXPLOSION (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965), did not even mention the potential efficacy of 
a pretrial conference convened for the purpose of settlement. See James B. Little, Book 
Review, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 238 (1966). 
 38 See, e.g., HARRY D. NIMS, PRE-TRIAL 28 (1950) (“After a frank discussion by 
counsel as to the value of the case, I give expression as to what, in my judgement, the case 
should be settled for.” (quoting Judge Cornelius J. Harrington)); id. at 34 (“[T]he Court 
frequently points out the strong points and the weak points of either the plaintiff’s claim, or 
of the defense, as the case may be, in endeavoring to bring the parties to an agreement.” 
(quoting Judge Alexander Holtzoff)); Ruggero J. Aldisert, A Metropolitan Court Conquers 
Its Backlog, 51 JUDICATURE 247, 248 (1968) (noting that he makes “a realistic appraisal of 
both sides” of a case); Ryan & Wickham, supra note 34, at 16 (“I offer suggestions, 
intimate to the attorneys and clients the possibility and extent of liability, suggest the range 
of what I believe to be a fair settlement, and then also attempt to persuade the parties and 
their attorneys to accept a settlement within that range.” (quoting Judge Herman W. 
Sachtjen)); J. Skelly Wright, The Pretrial Conference (“I tell them, ‘This case is worth 
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The system for assigning cases, however, served as a second source of 
restraint on behavior, especially in state courts where judges tended to be more 
active in settlement. Many courts used a master calendar system that placed 
cases in central pools and assigned judges particular functions such as 
motions, pretrial conferences, or trial, often in rotation.39 This meant that a 
single case would be handled by multiple judges and, if a case did not settle at 
a pretrial conference, a different judge would be assigned to preside at trial.40  
At least some judicial advocates of using pretrial conferences to encourage 
settlement considered this separate trial assignment to be a crucial design 
feature. In the words of Harry M. Fisher, a pretrial conference judge of the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, “We regard it as of the utmost 
importance that the conference be held by a judge other than the one who will 
be assigned to hear the case in the event a formal trial becomes necessary.”41 
The reasons were partly functional: lawyers would be willing to make 
disclosures, and judges would feel free to participate in a discussion of the 
merits of the case as part of the settlement process.42 They also reflected 
concerns for neutrality and the integrity of trials: “[l]awyers would feel, 
rightfully so, that no judge could successfully detach himself from the 
information absorbed during the conference or escape forming views on the 
merits of the case which might unconsciously color his rulings at the trial.”43 
                                                                                                                     
$20,000 for the settlement,’ and I tell them why; and I tell them further to go tell their 
clients that I said so.”), in Seminar on Practice and Procedure, supra note 21, at 141, 145. 
 39 See generally MAUREEN SOLOMON, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT 
10–13 (1973) (suggesting standards and guidelines for planning, developing, and operating 
an effective case management system). 
 40 This separation was especially prevalent under state court master calendar systems. 
See NIMS, supra note 38, at 22 (describing pretrial conferences as used in New York 
County, New York (Manhattan) and noting “[t]he chance that the pre-trial judge will try 
the case, if it is not ended in the conference, is very, very small”); id. at 28 (“[I]f counsel 
cannot agree [on a settlement] then the case is reassigned to the head of the assignment 
division for an immediate jury trial.” (quoting Judge Cornelius J. Harrington)); see also 
Ryan & Wickham, supra note 34, at 23–24 (describing a program in Milwaukee with 
separate, voluntary assignment to a judge for conciliation).  
The early practice regarding settlement judges in federal courts was more variable. 
Some federal courts assigned separate judges for pretrial and trial functions. See George L. 
Hart, Jr., The Operation of the Master Calendar System in the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia (describing separate processes for assigning cases to judges in 
the Pre-Trial and Ready for Trial Calendars), in Seminar on Effective Judicial 
Administration, supra note 21, at 265, 266–67; Holtzoff, supra note 23, at 23 (describing a 
system in which a pretrial examiner was devoted to conducting pretrial hearings, freeing 
judges for trial work). In other federal courts, pretrial conferences were held shortly before 
trial and were often conducted by the trial judge regardless of the type of calendaring 
system. See Shafroth, supra note 16, at 250 (“[F]ederal districts where the pre-trial judge 
does not try the case are very few . . . [.]”). 
 41 Fisher, supra note 23, at 220.  
 42 Id.; Holtzoff, supra note 16, at 762. 
 43 Fisher, supra note 37, at 455; see also Maurice Rosenberg, Mastering the Calendar 
(“[T]he central calendar avoids the unseemly situation of having the same judge—who at 
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B. Stage 2: Active Judicial Participation in Settlement Leading to Rule 
16 Authorization 
In the 1970s, a “forthright and ardent embrace of active participation” 
displaced the by-product framework as the dominant approach to settlement in 
federal pretrial conferences.44 At the same time, a movement toward 
individual calendar systems in the federal courts meant that more judges had 
responsibility for cases from their inception.45 These changes were part of the 
well-documented shift in judicial self-conception from neutral adjudicator to 
active case manager.46 Effectiveness in settlement was regarded as a crucial 
aspect of the pretrial management role. As expressed by Chief Judge Noel P. 
Fox of the Western District of Michigan, “judge-mediator participation in 
pretrial settlement negotiations is an essential part of imaginative, active 
administration of the court calendar.”47  
The high level of enthusiasm for settlement is indicated by the statement, 
described in a mid-1980s judicial opinion as a “familiar axiom,” that “a bad 
settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”48 As in the earlier era, 
settlement as a mode of docket control continued to be an important 
motivating factor for judicial involvement,49 and now the compilation of 
                                                                                                                     
pretrial hears the lawyers frankly admit specific weaknesses in their case—later preside at 
trial of the case.”), in Seminar on Effective Judicial Administration, supra note 21, at 271, 
279; E.J. Dimock, Book Review, 36 A.B.A. J. 837, 837 (1950) (reviewing NIMS, supra 
note 38) (noting the general custom of keeping the settlement conference judge away from 
the trial and opining that “[a] party who has stuck to his settlement figure in the face of 
pressure from a judge has a right to have his case tried before another whom he has not 
antagonized”). 
 44 Galanter, supra note 16, at 261; see also FREDERICK B. LACEY, THE JUDGE’S ROLE 
IN THE SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL SUITS 3 (1977) (“The nonactivists had their day. The activists 
are now in the ascendancy, as times change and case loads become increasingly 
burdensome both in number and complexity of suits.”); Peckham, supra note 1, at 774 
(“[M]ost judges routinely consider prospects for settlement at the pretrial conference and 
consider settlement promotion to be one of the chief purposes of pretrial . . . .”). 
 45 Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Costs of Litigation: Case 
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 257 (1985) (describing the switch in the late 1960s to a single-
assignment model in metropolitan federal districts). With the individual calendar system, a 
case is typically assigned to an individual judge when it is filed and that judge has 
responsibility for the case throughout its life. STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND 
COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 13–15 (1977).  
 46 See generally E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of 
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Peckham, supra note 1; Resnik, supra note 1. 
 47 Noel P. Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 
F.R.D. 129, 132 (1972); see also LACEY, supra note 44, at 5 (“The more efficient the judge 
and the more talented he is as an administrator the more cases he will settle . . . .”). 
 48 In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 
798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 49 See, e.g., Elwood M. Rich, An Experiment with Judicial Mediation, 66 A.B.A. J. 
530, 530 (1980) (expressing enthusiasm about institutionalizing settlement conferences, 
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docket statistics gave a ready measure of accountability that increased the 
pressure for quicker settlements and dispositions.50 However, unlike the 
judicial writing on Rule 16 in the earlier decades (which emphasized almost 
exclusively the docket benefits of settlement),51 for some the enthusiasm for 
settlement during this era had an additional grounding: a conviction that 
settlement produced superior outcomes.52 Thus, Judge Hubert L. Will of the 
Northern District of Illinois proclaimed “in most cases, the absolute result of a 
trial is not as high a quality of justice as is the freely negotiated, give a little, 
take a little settlement.”53  
This enthusiasm translated into widespread judicial involvement with 
settlement at pretrial conferences, although more conservative attitudes also 
persisted. Contemporary observations suggest that the extent and intensity of 
judicial intervention varied greatly,54 an impression supported by the research 
                                                                                                                     
which eliminated a chronic backlog in a California Superior Court in ten months). See 
generally Peckham, supra note 45, at 253 (identifying pretrial judicial case management as 
the “prevailing response” to high costs of litigation). 
 50 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1, at 404. In addition, settlement activity received 
encouragement from favorable publicity among the judiciary. Leroy J. Tornquist, The 
Active Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 743, 750 (1989) (noting attention given to judges active in settlement: “They are 
invited to give seminars to new judges. Their views are published in Federal Rules 
Decisions and disseminated in booklets by the Federal Judicial Center.”). 
 51 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 52 Galanter, supra note 16, at 261; see also Dep’t of Pub. Advocate v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. 
Utils., 503 A.2d 331, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (stating that the policy 
encouraging settlement is not to relieve dockets, but because “parties to a dispute are in the 
best position to determine how to resolve a contested matter in a way which is least 
disadvantageous to everyone”). 
 53 Hubert L. Will et al., The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in 
Proceedings of Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Court Judges, 75 
F.R.D. 89, 203, 203 (1976). Judge Will was not alone. Chief Judge Fox of the Western 
District Court of Michigan described settlement as at least coequal to adjudicated 
decisions: “We accept settlement as a preferred means of disposition. We believe that 
encouragement of settlement is an important use of pretrial and is consistent with the 
overriding goal ‘to further the disposition of cases according to right and justice on the 
merits.’” Fox, supra note 47, at 134–35 (footnote omitted) (quoting William J. Brennan, 
Jr., Pretrial Proceedings in New Jersey — A Demonstration, 28 N.Y. ST. B. BULL. 442, 
449 (1956)); see also id. at 142 (stating that settlement can be expected to “reflect the 
parties’ evaluation of the actual merits of the case” thus producing “results which are 
probably as close to the ideal of justice as we are capable of producing”). 
 54 See, e.g., ROBERT MCC. FIGG ET AL., CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 315 (1974) (stating that 
the role of the pretrial conference “may vary from one in which the conference is used to 
force settlement to one in which the mere mention of the word settlement is taboo”); 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 506–07 (observing a variety of conceptions of judicial 
settlement roles and associated techniques); Perspectives from the Federal Trial and 
Appellate Bench: Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy, THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1984, at 1, 9 
[hereinafter Kennedy] (“[S]ome judges participate a great deal, . . . and others don’t 
participate at all.”). 
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work from the era.55 According to a nationwide survey of state trial judges 
published in 1980, many judges were involved in settlement; over three-
quarters described themselves as intervening at least occasionally to promote 
settlement discussions.56 Of these, approximately 10% reported taking an 
aggressive role “through the use of direct pressure.”57 A second survey 
published in 1980 also conveys a sense of activism in settlement, finding that 
it was common for judges to initiate settlement discussions, especially in jury 
cases, and that substantial numbers of judges reported suggesting settlement 
terms.58 In contrast, a separate survey of lawyers in the early 1980s portrayed 
judges as far less likely to participate in settlement,59 but reported that this 
                                                                                                                     
 55 See FRANKLIN N. FLASCHNER JUDICIAL INSTITUTE, INC., THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN 
CASE SETTLEMENT 2 (1980) (reporting differences of opinion among Massachusetts state 
and federal judges on the appropriateness of an active role in settlement proceedings); 
David Neubauer, Judicial Role and Case Management, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 223, 227–28 (1978) 
(reporting both activist and abstentionist federal judges based on interviews in three federal 
districts). 
 56 JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND 
PERFORMANCES 177 tbl.8-2 (1980). Only 21.8% of the judges surveyed stated that they 
typically did not participate in settlement discussions. Id. Thus these authors concluded that 
the primary issue was “not whether but how a judge will intervene in pre-trial conference.” 
Id. at 177. 
 57 Id. at 177 tbl.8-2. The study found that the type of calendar system was 
significantly related to the style of intervention. Id. at 182. Where the court used a master 
calendar, 20% of the judges reported intervening aggressively in pretrial negotiations, 
whereas this was reported by only 9% of judges in courts with individual calendaring 
systems. Id.  
 58 See Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:” Judicial 
Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 7, 17 n.42 (1985) (describing a survey 
conducted by the Civil Litigation Research Project). The survey polled state and federal 
judges in five judicial districts about their typical settlement practices. Id. Seventy-five 
percent of federal judges and 56% of state court judges reported initiating settlement 
discussions in jury cases. Id. Forty-one percent of the federal judges and 56% of the state 
judges reported suggesting terms for settlement. Id. For bench trials, fewer judges reported 
these activities. Id. 
When the self-reports from judges in this survey were combined with the views of 
lawyers who appeared before them, there was further support for a conclusion that judges 
assigned to a case for trial were frequently involved in settlement discussions. Herbert M. 
Kritzer, The Judge’s Role in Pretrial Case Processing: Assessing the Need for Change, 66 
JUDICATURE 28, 30–34, 34 n.12 (1982). Judicial settlement activities ranged from initiating 
settlement discussions to more intensive, less frequent, activities such as meeting 
separately with each side and suggesting settlement figures. Id. at 31; see also Eugene F. 
Lynch, Settlement of Civil Cases: A View from the Bench, LITIGATION, Fall 1978, at 8, 57–
58 (describing his typical evaluation of the case with the plaintiff). 
 59 James A. Wall, Jr. & Lawrence F. Schiller, Judicial Involvement in Pre-Trial 
Settlement: A Judge Is Not a Bump on a Log, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27, 35 (1982) 
(concluding that judges participated “significantly” in only 34% of settlement 
proceedings). But see WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS’ VIEWS 
ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 12 (1985) 
(criticizing the question that led to this conclusion as “ambiguous”). 
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participation included practices, such as perceived coercion to settle, that were 
considered unethical by many of the lawyers.60  
How did litigants react to the more prevalent involvement of judges in 
settlement? While I can find no studies of clients at the time, attorneys in four 
different federal districts were very enthusiastic. In response to a survey of 
lawyers by Wayne Brazil in the early 1980s, an amazing 85% of the 
respondents agreed that “involvement by federal judges in settlement 
discussions [is] likely to improve significantly the prospects for achieving 
settlement.”61 The survey indicated that a majority of lawyers preferred a 
judge to participate “actively” in settlement by offering suggestions and 
observations.62 There was, however, one major exception to the enthusiasm: 
lawyers were far less comfortable with judicial involvement in settlement 
when the settlement judge was also the judge assigned for trial.63 
In 1983, Rule 16 (which, it should be recalled, originally did not even 
mention settlement)64 was amended to be consistent with the existing practice 
of widespread judicial involvement in settlement. The amendment’s expansion 
of authority for settlement activity during pretrial proceedings was consistent 
with the other 1983 changes to Rule 16, which overall “shift[ed] the emphasis 
away from a conference focused solely on the trial and toward a process of 
judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase.”65 But the 
Advisory Committee acknowledged that the changes regarding settlement 
merely conformed the rule to existing practice, stating that the new rule 
“explicitly recognize[d] that it ha[d] become commonplace to discuss 
settlement at pretrial conferences.”66 
The language of the new Rule established a judicial role for settlement 
with a broad scope. The Rule’s new list of purposes for pretrial conferences 
officially recognized judicial authority for “facilitating the settlement of the 
case.”67 The scope of “facilitating” is undefined but, given prevailing practices 
at the time, it can be understood as authorizing judges to intervene directly as 
                                                                                                                     
 60 The lawyers’ reports of judicial behaviors included “[c]oerces lawyers to settle” 
(reported by 54% of lawyers surveyed; considered unethical by 51%); “[p]oints out to the 
client the strengths and weaknesses of his case” (reported by 52%; considered unethical by 
29%); “[d]elays rulings to the disadvantage of the stronger side” (reported by 48%; 
considered unethical by 65%); and “[d]owngrades the merit of the stronger case and/or the 
demerits of the weaker” (reported by 45%; considered unethical by 20%). Wall & Schiller, 
supra note 59, at 35–36, app. at 43 tbl.2, 44 tbl.3. 
 61 BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 1, 39 (alteration in original). Professor Kritzer’s survey 
also indicates that lawyers believed judicial participation had an important influence on the 
settlement process. See Kritzer, supra note 58, at 35–36. 
 62 BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 46; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 497 
(“[L]awyers overwhelmingly seem to favor judicial intervention.”). 
 63 BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 84; see infra notes 260–66 and accompanying text. 
 64 See supra note 19. 
 65 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) advisory committee’s note on 1983 amend. 
 66 Id. R. 16(c) advisory committee’s note on 1983 amend. 
 67 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (1983).  
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settlement neutrals in order to lead negotiations between the parties. The new 
Rule 16 also contemplated a planning function distinct from direct 
participation in negotiations. It granted judges authority to “consider and take 
action with respect to . . . the possibility of settlement or the use of 
extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute.”68  
Thus the concept of judicial settlement activity embedded in Rule 16 
included both serving as a settlement neutral and planning for a resolution 
procedure that would be conducted extrajudicially by someone else. Moreover, 
the provisions in the 1983 rule endorsed these settlement roles for judges 
within a framework of abundant pretrial judicial discretion carried over from 
the original Rule 16.69 The Advisory Committee notes did express a caution 
that echoed the reasoning behind the drafters’ original decision to omit 
settlement from the 1938 rule.70 While noting that “providing a neutral forum” 
to discuss settlement “might foster it,” the Advisory Committee emphasized 
that it was not the purpose of the rule “to impose settlement negotiations on 
unwilling litigants.”71 Further, the drafters seem to have contemplated that, 
ideally, someone other than the assigned judge should lead the settlement 
process.72 Yet, by failing to distinguish a judge’s planning and neutral 
functions, the rule conflated them in a way that misleadingly identified them 
both with “management,” eliding an important distinction and obscuring 
thinking about the boundaries of the appropriate role of judges in settlement.  
C. Stage 3: Expansion of Court-Sponsored “Alternative” Dispute 
Resolution, with New Managerial Roles for Judges  
The third phase of development in settlement practices—court-sponsored 
settlement programs—broadened the focus from conferences convened at the 
discretion of individual judges to processes offered on an institutional basis. 
The programs were often motivated by the same concerns about cost and delay 
in civil litigation that had been associated with the rise of managerial judging, 
but those concerns now grew to a conviction that a litigation explosion was 
causing a full-blown crisis of congestion in the courts that was severe enough 
to impair access to justice.73 While it is important to note that both the 
                                                                                                                     
 68 Id. R. 16(c)(7).  
 69 If there were any doubt about judicial discretion, the rule included an open-ended 
authorization for conferences to include “such other matters as may aid in the disposition 
of the action.” Id. R. 16(c)(11). 
 70 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 71 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s note on 1983 amend. 
 72 Id. (suggesting that “a judge to whom a case has been assigned may arrange . . . to 
have settlement conferences handled by another member of the court or by a magistrate”). 
 73 This viewpoint was influentially expressed by Chief Justice Burger. Warren E. 
Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982); see also Robert H. Bork, 
Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts (describing “an overload so serious that the 
integrity of the federal system is threatened”), in Addresses Delivered at the National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 
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explosion and ensuing crisis were contested,74 the perception of a crisis 
generated proposals to deal with it: chiefly reforms to discovery procedures 
and increased attention to settlement as a means to remove cases from court 
dockets.75  
Chronologically, the development of court programs overlapped with the 
growing enthusiasm for judicial settlement conferences that took place in 
Stage 2. Professor Frank Sander’s speech describing a vision of a multi-door 
courthouse at the 1976 Roscoe Pound Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice is often cited as a key event 
in the association between ADR programs and U.S. courts.76 Innovative 
federal districts began offering mediation programs and court-annexed 
nonbinding arbitration in the late 1970s.77 This was also a time when 
experimentation with new forms of ADR flourished, and districts began to 
offer processes that judges invented especially for use in the courts, including 
early neutral evaluation78 and the summary jury trial.79 While only a few 
courts developed full-fledged multi-door programs in which litigants could 
choose the process best suited to their case from a large menu,80 many 
courts—both federal and state—eventually established programs that provided 
(or required) dispute resolution processes other than judicial settlement 
conferences.81 
                                                                                                                     
F.R.D. 79, 231, 232 (1976) [hereinafter Pound Conference]; Morris E. Lasker, The Court 
Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 245–46 (1978); Maria L. Marcus, Judicial 
Overload: The Reasons and the Remedies, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 111, 111 (1979); Harry 
Phillips, The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction and the Crisis in the Courts, 31 VAND. L. 
REV. 17, 17 (1978). 
 74 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1907–09 
(1989) (citing studies). 
 75 Burger, supra note 73, at 276; see also Griffin B. Bell, Crisis in the Courts: 
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 3, 12–13 (1978). 
 76 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in Pound Conference, supra 
note 73, at 111, 130–32. 
 77 DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT 1 
(Nov. 2011). 
 78 See generally Wayne D. Brazil et al., Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental 
Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279 (1986). 
 79 See generally James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 213 (1989); Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative 
Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States 
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984). 
 80 See, e.g., Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door 
Courthouse, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 580–85 (1988); Kenneth K. Stuart & Cynthia A. 
Savage, The Multi-Door Courthouse: How It’s Working, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 13. 
 81 This development was not limited to the United States. See, e.g., Louise Otis & Eric 
H. Reiter, Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation of Justice, 6 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 353 (2006) (describing Quebec’s “unified and integrated 
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A significant spur to the growth of federal court ADR came with the 
enactment of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).82 It required 
district courts to consider six case management principles, one of which was 
referral to ADR programs, and to adopt expense and delay reduction plans.83 
The local nature of the plans, which were developed with input from advisory 
committees in each district, led to great variation,84 but many districts included 
some form of ADR as an element of their plan.85 By 1996, mediation had 
become the most common ADR process offered by the federal courts; it was 
available in over half the districts.86 During the same time period, many state 
courts also instituted mediation programs.87 
The authority of the CJRA expired in 1997, but the Judicial Conference 
urged local districts to continue to develop ADR programs.88 And the 
following year, Congress turned the CJRA’s encouragement of court ADR 
into a mandate. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (ADR Act) 
                                                                                                                     
hybrid system of justice” that combines adjudicative and mediative processes at every level 
of the court system). 
 82 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012)); see Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Some 
Observations and Suggestions Regarding the Settlement Activities of Massachusetts Trial 
Judges, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 263, 279 (1997) (“Under the [CJRA], numerous federal 
district courts have gone much further than Federal Rule 16 in developing the concept of 
early court intervention and early utilization of the most appropriate dispute resolution 
method in each case.” (footnote omitted)); Thomas P. Griesa, Comment: One Court’s 
Experience with the CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV. 261, 262–63 (1997) (noting that while the 
CJRA plan in the S.D.N.Y. was mostly a “codification” of case management policies the 
district had been using for many years, its innovation was the addition of a mediation 
program). 
 83 104 Stat. at 5089–93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–473). 
 84 Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 884 (1993); see also Edward D. 
Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts be Remedied by 
Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 721, 728 (1993) (arguing that the collision of the local 
and national rulemaking processes created confusion and inconsistencies); Lauren Robel, 
Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1447 
(1994) (arguing that the broad exercise of local rulemaking powers that spawned the 
variation was based on a misreading of the legislation). 
 85 STIENSTRA, supra note 77, at 1. 
 86 ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STEINSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 4 (1996). In 
addition, the federal courts of appeals developed active mediation programs under the 
authority of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which authorizes settlement 
conferences. See generally ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION AND CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1997). 
 87 For a sampling, see generally COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED STATE AND FEDERAL PROGRAMS (Edward J. Bergman & John 
G. Bickerman eds., 1998). 
 88 STIENSTRA, supra note 77, at 2. 
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required each federal district court to offer at least one ADR process—
including, but not limited to, mediation, early neutral evaluation, minitrial, and 
(when specially authorized) arbitration—and to adopt local rules requiring 
civil litigants to consider its use.89 These ADR programs have become a 
common feature of the settlement landscape in many federal district courts. A 
2011 Federal Judicial Center review of district court ADR reveals that 
mediation remains the most common court-connected process; two-thirds of 
the ninety-four district courts have authorized it as a distinct ADR process.90 
Almost one-quarter of the districts authorize early neutral evaluation, with 
smaller numbers including rules for summary jury or bench trials, mini-trials, 
or settlement weeks.91 Slightly more than one-third authorize multiple forms 
of ADR.92  
Along with these new programs, judges have continued to conduct 
settlement conferences.93 A few districts placed settlement conferences in their 
ADR programs.94 However, most courts did not integrate their provisions 
governing Rule 16 settlement conferences with the new rules they adopted for 
their ADR programs pursuant to the CJRA and the ADR Act. This is perhaps 
understandable as a historical accident: courts incorporated settlement 
conferences and ADR programs into their procedures at different times and 
under distinct authorizations. Moreover, conceptually, ADR meant alternatives 
to traditional processes, while settlement conferences were, by this time, 
solidly traditional.95 
                                                                                                                     
 89 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2012). In the case of mediation and early neutral evaluation, 
the Act also authorized the courts to require parties to use these ADR processes. Id. 
 90 STIENSTRA, supra note 77, at 6, 7 tbl.2. According to the local rules and other 
written sources, in more than one-quarter of these district courts, mediation is the only 
specifically-authorized process. Id. at 5 & tbl.1. The indication that mediation is authorized 
in two-thirds of the districts, id. at 7 tbl.2, is likely a conservative estimate. It reflects only 
specifically authorized mediation programs in districts that provide guidance for their use, 
while additional districts have a general authorization for ADR or establish an “open” or 
“general” management track allowing cases to use ADR. Id. at 5 tbl.1, 6. Although these 
more general authorizations may mention mediation or another form of ADR, Stienstra 
does not count them because the lack of detail casts doubt on the existence of an active 
court-administered ADR program. Id. 
 91 Id. at 6, 7 tbl.2. Court-annexed arbitration, while still authorized by a significant 
number of courts, plays a smaller role today than it did during earlier decades. Id. No 
district relies solely on court-annexed arbitration as its ADR process. Id. at 6. 
 92 Id. at 4–5, 5 tbl.1. Fourteen districts authorize three or more processes. Id. at 5. 
 93 See, e.g., DAVID RAUMA & DONNA STIENSTRA, THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLANS: A SOURCEBOOK 253 tbl.11 (1995) (compiling 
provisions on settlement conferences from local CJRA plans and rules). 
 94 As of 2011, ten districts satisfied the ADR Act’s mandate by designating settlement 
conferences as the sole type of ADR process they authorize by local rule. STIENSTRA, 
supra note 77, at 5 tbl.1, 6. 
 95 See Donna Stienstra, ADR in the Federal Trial Courts, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 1994, 
at 4, 7 n.1 (“Because ADR is defined in contrast to ‘traditional’ litigation, the judge-hosted 
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Even today, local federal rules typically do not cover settlement in a single 
coherent set of rules. The rules governing district court ADR programs often 
define “ADR” in a way that does not include either settlement conferences or 
judicial mediation, and only one-third of the local ADR rules even mention the 
settlement conferences authorized by Rule 16.96 Procedures for settlement 
conferences tend to be covered, if at all, in a section of the local rules that is 
separate from the ADR provisions.97 This continuing lack of integration seems 
strange given the common focus on settlement. And it has had practical 
consequences in that a judge’s role as a settlement neutral is often treated 
differently in the two contexts.  
Regardless of the structure of the local rules, the expansion of court-
sponsored dispute resolution processes has led to changes in the roles judges 
play in managing settlement (as distinct from the roles associated with 
presiding as settlement neutral). When the only court-connected settlement 
option was a judicial settlement conference, a judge’s management functions 
consisted primarily of initiating the conference process by encouraging (or 
                                                                                                                     
settlement conference—a long-standing component of the traditional process—is often not 
considered a form of ADR.”). 
 96 STIENSTRA, supra note 77, at 6 (commenting, however, that “[w]e can be certain 
that a greater number of districts use settlement conferences, but many very likely do not 
mention this procedure in their ADR provisions”). 
 97 Many federal district courts provide comprehensive ADR provisions without 
including procedures for settlement conferences. See, e.g., D.D.C. CIV. R. 84–84.10; M.D. 
FLA. R. 9.01–.07; S.D. IND. LOCAL ADR RULES; W.D. MO. MEDIATION & ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM; D. NEB. MEDIATION PLAN; D.N.H. CIV. R. 53.1; D.N.H. GUIDELINES FOR 
MEDIATION PROGRAM; E.D.N.Y. R. 83.7 (arbitration); id. R. 83.8 (mediation); N.D.N.Y. 
MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM (General Order 47); W.D.N.Y. ADR PLAN; M.D.N.C. 
CIV. R. 83.9a–.9g; N.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.4–.7; S.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.3; S.D. OHIO CIV. R. 
SUPP. PROCEDURES FOR ADR; E.D. TEX. COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION PLAN (General 
Order 14-6). Similarly, local rules on pretrial procedures often include specific provisions 
on mediation, or ADR more generally, without mentioning settlement conferences. See, 
e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 16-15; D. COLO. CIV. R. 16.6; N.D. FLA. R. 16.3; S.D. FLA. R. 16.2; 
N.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.7; S.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.7.5; D. KAN. R. 16.3; D. MASS. R. 16.4; E.D. 
MO. R. 16.01–.05; D.S.C. CIV. R. 16.03–.12; D. UTAH CIV. R. 16.2; D. VT. R. 16.1; N.D. 
W. VA. CIV. R. 16.06. Rules on pretrial do sometimes mention settlement likelihood or 
prospects as a topic for discussion at pretrial conferences, but without providing procedures 
for settlement conferences. See, e.g., D. DEL. R. 16.1; M.D. FLA. R. 3.06(b); S.D. FLA. R. 
16.1; D. MASS. R. 16.3(a); D.N.H. CIV. R. 16.3(c); N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1(d); M.D.N.C. CIV. R. 
16.1(b). Or, they may contain detailed provisions that are limited to procedures for 
managing the settlement process. See, e.g., D.D.C. CIV. R. 16.3. When there is a rule that 
specifically authorizes or governs settlement conferences, it is typically separate from the 
rule on ADR processes. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 270, 271; D. Haw. R. 16.5, 88.1; C.D. ILL. 
R. 16.1, 16.4; N.D. IND. R 16.1, 16.6; N.D. MISS. R. 16(g), 83.7; D.N.J. CIV. R. 16.2(a), 
201.1, 301.1. There are exceptions. Some courts specify procedures for settlement 
conferences and ADR under the umbrella of the same rule. See, e.g., D. ALASKA CIV. R. 
16.2(c); N.D. CAL. ADR R. 3.4(c), 7.1–.5; D. CONN. CIV. R. 16(c), (h); D. IDAHO CIV. R. 
16.4; W.D. MICH. Civ. R. 16; E.D.N.C. ADR R. 101.2; W.D.N.C. CIV. R. 16.3(D); W.D. 
OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2–.3; M.D. PA. CIV. R. 16.7–.9.5; D.R.I. ADR PLAN. 
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requiring) parties to participate and considering what timing would be 
productive for settlement discussions. With multiple ADR options available, 
management functions expanded.98 In many courts, judges became involved in 
pretrial settlement planning by assessing cases for the ADR program and, in 
courts with multiple processes, matching them with a specific ADR process.99 
An analysis of the current local federal rules reveals that judges are 
assigned multiple management functions for the settlement processes that 
courts offer through their ADR programs. In some districts, they play a role in 
selecting a neutral,100 in the timing of the process,101 or in setting the fees for a 
neutral.102 The most common judicial management function, however, is 
selecting an appropriate dispute resolution process. Many districts emphasize 
consultation with the judge at a case management conference as a means to 
encourage settlement efforts or to help the parties decide on the most 
appropriate dispute resolution process for their case.103 While a few districts 
                                                                                                                     
 98 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow identified three new management functions 
associated with the new ADR programs: “selecting cases for ADR, providing ADR 
neutrals, and managing cases that have been referred to ADR.” Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, 
Judicial Referral to ADR: Issues and Problems Faced by Judges, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 
1994, at 8, 8. Each district had to decide whether to address these issues with a court-wide 
policy, assign them to staff, or include them as part of individual judges’ pretrial functions. 
Id.; see also SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS’N & INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, PRESENTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION TO JUDGES: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING 
JUDICIAL TRAINING ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 31 (1996) (listing the roles of 
judges in ADR as “[p]rogram planning & implementation, [n]eutral selection, [c]ase 
assessment, ADR referral, [c]oordination between ADR and litigation ([c]ase monitoring, 
[j]udicial action, [and] [e]nsuring compliance), [and] [f]eedback on neutral and program 
effectiveness”). 
 99 See J. Daniel Breen, Mediation and the Magistrate Judge, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 
1007, 1012–13 (1996) (reporting that in the Western District of Tennessee, the local rule 
required discussions about settlement processes at the initial Rule 16(b) conference, with a 
determination of what ADR process would be most effective); Menkel-Meadow, supra 
note 98, at 8–9 (discussing factors relevant to the selection of cases for ADR processes by 
judges); id. at 11 (discussing the educational function of judges in assisting attorneys and 
parties to choose an appropriate process); see also NAT’L ADR INST. FOR FED. JUDGES, 
JUDGE’S DESKBOOK ON COURT ADR pt. C, at 53–60 (Elizabeth Plapinger et al. eds., 1993) 
(materials prepared for an educational institute on ADR for federal judges). 
 100 See, e.g., D. ALASKA CIV. R. 16.2(e); N.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.7(F)(1); S.D. GA. CIV. R. 
16.7.4; D. HAW. R. 88.1(d); D. IDAHO CIV. R. 16.4(b)(3)(D); D. KAN. R. 16.3(c)(1); W.D. 
LA. CIV. R. 16.3.1; E.D. TEX. COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION PLAN pt. VI (General Order 
14-6); E.D. WASH. R. 16.2(g); S.D. W. VA. CIV. R. 16.6.2; E.D. WIS. CIV. R. 16(d)(4)(D). 
 101 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 5-5, 6-5; E.D. TEX. COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION 
PLAN pt. VI (General Order 14-6). 
 102 See, e.g., S.D. TEX. CIV. R. 16.4.G.  
 103 See, e.g., D. DEL. R. 16.1; D. HAW. R. 16.2(a)(11); C.D. ILL. R. 16.4(D); D. KAN. R. 
16.3(c); D. ME. R. 16.3(b)–(c), 83.11; D. MASS. R. 16.4(b); D.N.H. CIV. R. 53.1(a); 
N.D.N.Y. R. 16.1(d)(10), (14), (15); S.D.N.Y. R. 83.9; W.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 16.2(b)–(c); N.D. 
OHIO CIV. R. 16.3(b); S.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.3(a); W.D. TENN. CIV. R. 16.3; D. UTAH CIV. 
R. 16-2(e); E.D. WIS. CIV. R. 16(d) (ADR evaluation conference). 
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make their ADR programs strictly voluntary by rule,104 many more districts 
grant judges authority to select a process and refer the parties, with or without 
their consent.105 Hence, judges are often expected to participate in the decision 
to use dispute resolution, and they are frequently assigned responsibility for 
referring the parties to a particular process.106 
Again, rather than leading change, Rule 16 was revised in a way that 
merely responded to these developments. The 1993 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure reacted boldly to concerns about expense and delay 
with controversial new discovery provisions: initial disclosures of 
information107 and presumptive limits on the number of depositions and 
interrogatories.108 The settlement amendments to Rule 16, however, did no 
more than refine the authorization for judges’ involvement in planning in a 
way that recognized the widespread adoption of court dispute resolution 
programs in the wake of the CJRA. A change in language emphasized the 
availability of court settlement procedures beyond the traditional judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 104 See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 271 (voluntary program); S.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.7.5 (court-
annexed mediation by election of the parties); C.D. ILL. R. 16.4(E) (referral to mediation 
only by parties’ agreement); E.D. LA. CIV. R. 16.3.1 (referral to private mediation, 
minitrial, or summary jury trial with parties’ consent); W.D. LA. CIV. R. 16.3.1 (same). 
Some courts require party consent for only selected forms of dispute resolution. See, e.g., 
E.D. TENN. R. 16.3(a), 16.5(a). These are typically court-annexed arbitration, summary jury 
trial, or summary bench trial. Occasionally districts offer parties the opportunity to make a 
dispute resolution process binding, which requires party consent. See, e.g., N.D. GA. CIV. 
R. 16.7(B)(1) (binding arbitration, summary jury trial, or bench trial). 
 105 See, e.g., N.D. FLA. R. 16.3; E.D.N.Y. R. 83.8; M.D. TENN. R. 16.04(b); W.D. VA. 
R. 83(b); S.D. W. VA. CIV. R. 16.6(a). It is common for rules to couple a provision that the 
judge will discuss ADR options with the parties with an authorization for the judge to 
select a process if the parties are unable to agree on one. See C.D. CAL. R. 16-15.3; N.D. 
CAL. ADR R. 3-2; W.D. PA. CIV. R. 16.2(d). Typical language allows a judge to order a 
dispute resolution process on the request of a party, by the agreement of the parties, or in 
the judge’s discretion (or on the court’s own motion). See, e.g., D. ALASKA CIV. R. 16.2(c); 
D. COLO. CIV. R. 16.6(a); D. HAW. R. 88.1(d); D. IDAHO CIV. R. 16.4(b)(2); N.D. & S.D. 
MISS. R. 83.7(c), (e)(1); N.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.5(b), 16.6(b); D. OR. R. 16-4(e); S.D. TEX. 
CIV. R. 16.4.C. Other districts simply grant the judge authority to order parties to use a 
dispute resolution process without elaborating on the role of party consent. See, e.g., N.D. 
ALA. CIV. R. 16.1; M.D. FLA. R. 9.03; N.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.7(B)(1); S.D. ILL. R. 16.3; D. 
MASS. R. 16.4; D. MINN. R. 16.5(b); D. MONT. R. 16.5; D. WYO. CIV. R. 16.3(b). 
 106 Alternatively, when judges are not involved in an initial process choice, they may 
play a role in exempting parties from dispute resolution as a check on an administrative 
determination. In districts that refer all cases with certain characteristics to a particular 
dispute resolution procedure, or in which an administrator selects and diverts cases, judges 
are often given the role of considering objections to the assigned process and deciding 
whether a specific case should be exempted from the referral. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 
3–3(c); E.D.N.C. CIV. R. 101.1(a); W.D.N.C. CIV. R. 16.2(B); N.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.7; 
E.D. PA. CIV. R. 53.2(3)(C)(3); W.D. TEX. CIV. R. 88(g). 
 107 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (1993). 
 108 Id. R. 30, 33(a). 
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settlement conferences,109 and the advisory committee notes stressed the new 
judicial planning roles that accompanied these expanded settlement 
opportunities.110 
Further, this amendment to Rule 16 reflected the institutionalization of 
ADR programs at the district court level through the local expense and delay 
plans. The Rule contained a new reference to procedures “authorized by 
statute or local rule,” which signified a shift from experimentation by 
individual judges to more predictable procedures adopted by each district.111 
In this way the amendment could be seen as a mild limitation on judicial 
discretion.112 The overall message, however, emphasized the great degree of 
discretion associated with settlement. The Seventh Circuit had recently upheld 
the exercise of judicial discretion to order a party to attend a Rule 16 
settlement conference as grounded in the court’s inherent power.113 Although 
procedural rules can limit courts’ authority to use their inherent power,114 the 
drafters of the 1993 amendments did not seek to restrict this exercise of 
discretion. Instead, the advisory committee notes contain multiple references 
recognizing the inherent powers of courts in the context of settlement and 
disavowing any intent to limit reasonable judicial exercise of those powers.115 
Thus the amendments were consistent with the views of judges who rejected 
the proposition that Rule 16 was “designed as a device to restrict or limit the 
authority of the district judge in the conduct of pretrial conferences.”116 And 
significantly, the Rule’s endorsement of a broad scope of judicial discretion 
                                                                                                                     
 109 The new rule replaced the reference to “extrajudicial” settlement procedures, FED. 
R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7) (1983), with language authorizing judges to consider and “take 
appropriate action, with respect to . . . settlement and the use of special procedures to assist 
in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) 
(1993). 
 110 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s note on 1993 amend. (“[T]he judge and 
attorneys can explore possible use of alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary 
jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration . . . .”). 
 111 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) (1993). 
 112 See In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 142 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he words ‘when 
authorized by statute or local rule’ are a frank limitation on the district courts’ authority to 
order mediation [under Rule 16] . . . .” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(9) (1993))). 
 113 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(en banc). 
 114 See, e.g., Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (holding that a 
court cannot rely on its supervisory power in contradiction of a procedural rule); United 
States v. ONE 1987 BMW 325, 985 F.2d 655, 661 (1st Cir. 1993); G. Heileman Brewing 
Co., 871 F.2d at 652; Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002 
(7th Cir. 1989); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (allowing use of 
inherent powers when the Civil Rules did not limit the nature of the sanction); Atl. Pipe, 
304 F.3d at 143. 
 115 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) advisory committee’s note on 1993 amend. (acknowledging 
inherent judicial authority to require disputants to engage in settlement procedures without 
their agreement and to require party participation). 
 116 G. Heileman Brewing Co., 871 F.2d at 652. 
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continued to blend the (now expanded) pretrial roles of promoting, organizing, 
and planning for settlement with authorization for judges to act as the 
settlement neutrals. 
D. Stage 4: Influence of Mediation on Judicial Settlement Practices  
In a fourth phase of development that overlaps chronologically with the 
growth of ADR programs in courts, the nature of judicial involvement in 
settlement has continued to evolve. Although there is a dearth of information 
on how judges actually behave in settlement,117 there is some evidence that in 
recent decades mediation has exerted an increasing influence on judicial 
settlement activity. Mediation practices and norms appear to have had a 
discernable effect on how many judges conceive their role—and on what they 
actually do—when they act as settlement neutrals. These developments in the 
way judges exercise this role make separating it from their adjudicatory and 
management functions all the more important.  
By the mid-1990s, commentators were reporting that “most federal judges 
favor and actively promote settlement,”118 creating what James Alfini 
described at the turn of the century as a “settlement culture” in the courts.119 In 
this culture, judges not only encourage settlement by referring parties to ADR 
processes, but they also frequently intervene directly in a role that Alfini 
tellingly labeled as “a mediator or case evaluator.”120 Alfini’s phrase reflects 
many judges’ expanded conception of their settlement roles to include 
facilitative mediation, but at the same time signals the ongoing vitality of more 
traditional settlement styles focused on evaluation.121 
In recent decades, judges have seen the growth in popularity of private 
mediation and the establishment of court-annexed mediation programs. They 
have had opportunities to learn to mediate: there are mediation training 
programs for judges122 and articles for judges explaining how to mediate.123 
                                                                                                                     
 117 See, e.g., John C. Cratsley, Judges and Settlement: So Little Regulation with So 
Much at Stake, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2011, at 4, 4. See generally Deborah Hensler, A 
Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-Connected ADR, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Fall 1999, at 15. 
 118 Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on 
Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 649 (1994). 
 119 James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases 
Assigned to Them for Trial, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11, 11; see also J. Maria 
Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1723 (2012) 
(“[S]ettlement . . . has become the dominant mode of civil dispute resolution.”); Samuel R. 
Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the 
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“A trial is a failure.”). 
 120 Alfini, supra note 119, at 11. 
 121 See infra notes 137–53 and accompanying text. 
 122 Organizations focused on judicial administration and the education of state and 
federal judges, such as the National Center for State Courts, Institute for Court 
Management, Federal Judicial Center, and the National Judicial College, have included 
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Judicial writing is replete with enthusiastic stories about the benefits of 
mediation124 and what Professor Jennifer Reynolds has called “conversion 
narratives” that focus on the “substantive justice benefits” of mediation’s 
alternative perspective.125 Some courts have established mediation programs 
in which judges officially serve as mediators.126 More generally, many 
individual judges now incorporate aspects of mediation when they serve as a 
settlement neutral.127 In this context there are judges who conduct what they 
                                                                                                                     
ADR in their training programs. Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 825 (1988); see also Alfini, supra note 119, at 
14; Steve Gizzi, Judging Meditation, 10 JOHN F. KENNEDY U. L. REV. 135, 136 (2004); 
Peter Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges Attempting to 
Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 335, 350. 
The influence of these programs is indicated by the number of judicial authors writing 
about settlement who describe receiving mediation training tailored for judges. See, e.g., 
Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediating Their Own Cases, 
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 147 (2001); Stephen G. Crane, Judge Settlements 
Versus Mediated Settlements, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2011, at 20, 21; Dan Aaron 
Polster, The Trial Judge as Mediator: A Rejoinder to Judge Cratsley, MAYHEW-HITE REP. 
ON DISP. RESOL. & CTS. n.3 (2006), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/epub/mayhew-hite/vol5iss1/le 
ad.html [https://perma.cc/5A6B-2JK2]. The educational trend is not limited to the United 
States. See Otis & Reiter, supra note 81, at 367 n.68 (stating that in Canada, the National 
Judicial Institute offers training programs in judicial mediation). But see John C. Cratsley, 
Judicial Ethics and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to Meet, 21 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 569, 576 (2006) (claiming that many judges have no formal 
mediation training and tend to rely on “procedures borrowed from ADR” combined with 
“personal settlement techniques”). 
 123 Charles B. Craver, When Parties Can’t Settle: Mediation Techniques Every Judge 
Needs to Master, JUDGES’ J., Winter 1987, at 4, 6–7 (emphasizing techniques for 
facilitative mediation as well as a role for evaluative skills). 
 124 See, e.g., Robert M. Levy, ADR in Federal Court: The View from Brooklyn, 26 
JUST. SYS. J. 343, 343 (2005) (noting that mediation “offers parties the opportunity to take 
control of their destiny”); Rich, supra note 49, at 530 (“More, more, and more mediation is 
the answer.”); Lisa Sullivan, ADR Offers What the Bench Cannot, MICH. B.J., Feb. 2006, at 
16, 16 (describing the “obvious benefits” of mediation). 
 125 Jennifer W. Reynolds, Judicial Reviews: What Judges Write When They Write 
About Mediation, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 111, 130 (2013). 
 126 See infra text accompanying notes 358–59. In the federal courts, magistrate judges 
are often the judicial officers who serve as mediators in court mediation programs. See, 
e.g., Breen, supra note 99, at 1008; Beth Deere, Federal Court Mediation, ARK. LAW., Fall 
2008, at 22, 22; Judith Gail Dein, Wearing Two Hats: Being a Mediator and a Trial Judge, 
BOS. B.J., Winter 2013; Morton Denlow, Magistrate Judges’ Important Role in Settling 
Cases, FED. LAW., May/June 2014, at 101, 103; Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice 
Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REV. 712, 739–
45 (1994); Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and Procedural Justice, 16 
NEV. L.J. 983, 1003–05 (2016). Judges are also active mediators in state court mediation 
programs. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 122, at 347–52 (describing state judicial 
mediation programs in California and Delaware). 
 127 See, e.g., Cratsley, supra note 122, at 573–74 (listing mediation techniques 
borrowed by settlement judges). 
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explicitly label as “mediation,”128 and other judges who advocate techniques 
for what they call “settlement conferences” that closely resemble methods 
associated with facilitative mediation.129 When set alongside more traditional 
judicial roles in settlement, the result is a melange of many different 
approaches. 
The labels “mediation” and “settlement conference” are not very helpful 
for informing parties what to expect in a settlement process. As a starting 
point, although local court rules frequently authorize the two processes 
separately,130 creating an implication that they are distinct processes with 
separate identities, there is no precise understanding of the differences between 
them.131 The labels encompass widely varying and overlapping practices, 
making their use problematic.132 As might be expected from a process that is 
considered part of managing cases, a judge hosting a conference might issue 
orders and limit issues, or alternatively conduct a process that appears identical 
to a mediation session.133 To confuse matters even more, although the type of 
process can have important legal consequences for confidentiality 
protections,134 participants and observers often make no distinction at all 
                                                                                                                     
 128 Karen K. Klein, A Judicial Mediator’s Perspective: The Impact of Gender on 
Dispute Resolution: Mediation as a Different Voice, 81 N.D. L. REV. 771, 785 (2005); 
Kristena A. LaMar, I Think I Blew It, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2011, at 12, 13; Steven J. 
Miller, Judicial Mediation: Two Judges’ Philosophies, LITIGATION, Spring 2012, at 31, 38 
(interview of Judge Polster). 
 129 Morton Denlow, Settlement Conference Techniques: Caucus Dos and Don’ts, 
JUDGES’ J., Spring 2010, at 21, 23 (advocating principles identified with mediation such as 
“client control of the outcome,” “confidentiality,” “creative resolution possibility,” and 
“preserving a continuing relationship”); Michael R. Hogan, Judicial Settlement 
Conferences: Empowering the Parties to Decide Through Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 429, 441 (1991) (describing the judge’s role as a “communication link[] between the 
parties”); id. at 443–44 (characterizing the settlement process as “reorient[ing] the parties 
away from competitive posturing” toward problem solving); id. at 445 (placing emphasis 
on exploring “underlying interests”); id. at 445–46 (emphasizing the need to listen and 
attend to feelings); see also Welsh, supra note 126, at 1019–21 (discussing the blurring of 
lines between settlement conferences and mediation).  
 130 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. But see D.N.D. R. 16.2 (authorizing 
“mediation in the form of court-sponsored settlement conferences held by judicial 
officers”).  
 131 Stienstra, supra note 95, at 7 n.1 (arguing that categorizing settlement conferences 
as distinct from ADR is problematic due to a lack of firm definitions of the processes). 
 132 See, e.g., Susan Nauss Exon, Foreword, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) 
(“[M]any now proclaim to mediate when, in fact, they are convening a settlement 
conference . . . .”); Carol M. Rice, The Civil Justice Reform Act Conference: A Reporter’s 
View, 49 ALA. L. REV. 265, 277 (1997) (noting difficulties in communication due to 
“inaccurate terminology” with the same label applied to varying court processes). 
 133 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(b)(3) cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). 
 134 For example, in California the protection for confidentiality of communications in 
mediation does not apply to judicial settlement conferences. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1117(b)(2) 
(West 2009); see also Foxgate Homeowners’ Ass’n. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 
1124 n.8 (Cal. 2001) (finding that confidentiality was required when a judge’s role was 
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between settlement conferences and mediation, treating them as equivalent.135 
Others simply label them based on the position of the neutral, calling any 
settlement procedure conducted by a judge a “conference.”136 This lack of 
clarity in terminology illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing the processes 
based on their characteristics.  
Along with confusion about designations, the distinction, in actual 
practice, between judicial behaviors in settlement conferences and mediations 
is not particularly clear. Even when comparing settlement conferences 
conducted by judges with mediations conducted by private neutrals, the 
contrasts are based, at best, on loose generalizations about the processes. In 
characterizing mediation and settlement conferences, Roselle Wissler notes a 
greater tendency in mediation to emphasize party involvement and to give 
prominence to the importance of parties’ views and interests.137 As a corollary 
to this, mediators are likely to spend more time “eliciting information from the 
                                                                                                                     
defined by party agreement as “act[ing] as [a] mediator for settlement conferences”). In 
contrast, the coverage of the Uniform Mediation Act, which establishes a privilege for 
mediation communications, does not rest on a distinction between mediation and 
settlement conferences. Instead, mediations “conducted by a judge who might make a 
ruling on the case” are excluded from coverage by the Act. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT 
§ 3(b)(3). 
 135 See, e.g., Cratsley, supra note 122, at 571 (combining judicial mediation and 
settlement conferences under the label “settlement activity”); Hogan, supra note 129, at 
445, 453 (referring to a judge conducting a settlement conference as a “judge mediator”); 
Robert A. Holtzman & Jeff Kichaven, Recent Developments in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 195, 213 (2004) (describing a court 
settlement process that was variously referred to as “mediation” and “settlement 
conference” despite the difference in applicable confidentiality rules and statutes); David 
A. Katz, Mediation—A Judge’s Views on Judicially Monitored Settlement Conferences, 
LITIGATION, Summer 2009, at 3, 3 (using terms interchangeably); Menkel-Meadow, supra 
note 16, at 510 (noting that some judges conducting settlement conferences call themselves 
mediators and are referred to as mediators); Rich, supra note 49, at 530 (identifying a 
settlement conference procedure as “mediation”); see also STACY LEE BURNS, MAKING 
SETTLEMENT WORK: AN EXAMINATION OF THE WORK OF JUDICIAL MEDIATORS (2000) 
(referring to active judges conducting settlement conferences in court and retired judges 
conducting private mediations using the single term “judicial mediator”). 
 136 Martin A. Frey, Does ADR Offer Second Class Justice?, 36 TULSA L.J. 727, 733 
(2001) (“If the mediator is a judge, . . . the process is called a settlement conference.”). 
 137 Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and 
Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 271, 291 (2011); see also 
Baer, supra note 122, at 146 (characterizing mediation as more likely to involve “the 
presence and participation of the parties”); Gregory D. Brown, The Judicially Hosted 
Settlement Conference—My Case in the Balance: Musings of a Trial Attorney, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2011, at 8, 9–10 (criticizing settlement conferences as suffering from 
relatively little client involvement); Charles R. Pyle, Mediation and Judicial Settlement 
Conferences: Different Rides on the Road to Resolution, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 1996, at 20, 54 
(describing settlement conferences as involving less client involvement and deference to 
clients than mediation). But see Robert C. Zampano, From the Bench: Settlement 
Strategies for Trial Judges, LITIGATION, Fall 1995, at 3, 69–70 (advocating personal 
participation of clients in settlement conferences). 
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parties than providing information to them.”138 Their orientation toward 
facilitating party self-determination139 makes mediators less likely to use 
“strong-arm tactics” than judges in settlement conferences.140 And mediators 
are thought to be more likely to adopt a problem-solving approach than the 
predictive or evaluative methods typically associated with judges.141 
Wissler stresses, however, that these differences between judicial 
settlement conferences and private mediations are “more a matter of degree 
than kind.”142 Difficulties in separating the processes stem in part from the 
wide range of approaches that mediators employ, which can encompass both 
facilitation and evaluation.143 Moreover, the plethora of retired judges who 
                                                                                                                     
 138 Wissler, supra note 137, at 291; see also Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a 
Representative of the System of Civil Justice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 233 n.9 
(2007) (observing that, as a magistrate judge conducting settlement conferences, he talked 
more than court-trained mediators). 
 139 Brown, supra note 137, at 8 (describing judges as “widely perceived” to be “less 
interested than many mediators in . . . enhancing your client’s sense of personal 
empowerment over the resolution of the case”); Wissler, supra note 137, at 291–92. 
 140 Wissler, supra note 137, at 291–92. 
 141 Id. at 292; see also Craig A. McEwen, Pursuing Problem-Solving or Predictive 
Settlement, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 77, 78–79 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Judges and 
Settlement: What Part Should Judges Play?, TRIAL, Oct. 1985, at 24, 27–28 (arguing that 
judges often act as arbitrators or adjudicators during settlement conferences); Pyle, supra 
note 137, at 21 (“[J]udges are ‘evaluators’ while . . . mediators are ‘facilitators.’” (quoting 
Charles B. Wiggins, professor and mediator)). Settlement conferences are also 
characterized as taking less time than mediation and as cheaper because there is no need to 
compensate a private neutral. Baer, supra note 122, at 146; Brown, supra note 137, at 8–9; 
Pyle, supra note 137, at 22. 
 142 Wissler, supra note 137, at 291 n.82; see also Hensler, supra note 117, at 17 
(suggesting that settlement conferences are much like mediation, which is often evaluative 
and distributive); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 1, 25–26 (2001) (noting “uncanny resemblance” between settlement conferences and 
court-connected mediations, which often emphasize legal issues). 
 143 See Leonard L. Riskin, Commentary, Mediator Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111 (1994) (contrasting facilitative 
and evaluative approaches, and broad and narrow problem definitions); see also Brazil, 
supra note 138, at 230–31 (characterizing court-connected mediations as “stylistically 
nonlinear events” that include both facilitative and evaluative elements); Dwight Golann, 
Variations in Mediation: How—And Why—Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course 
of a Case, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 41, 42 (reporting that mediators flexibly move among 
styles during the course of a mediation). Mediation has also been described in terms of 
other contrasting characteristics. See DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE MEDIATORS 23–45 (1983) 
(contrasting dealmakers and orchestrators); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in 
Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 
30–33 (2003) (contrasting elicitive and directive approaches); Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. 
Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y 7, 19–25 (1986) (contrasting 
bargaining and therapeutic styles). 
The lack of agreement on what constitutes “mediation” is reflected in a debate on what 
should be appropriately included in a mediator’s role. Compare, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach 
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have developed second careers as private mediators has further muddied the 
distinction, as some of them have transferred stereotypical settlement 
conference techniques to mediation.144  
If it is difficult to separate judges’ behaviors in court settlement 
conferences from those of private mediators, it is even more difficult to 
distinguish between behaviors in “settlement conferences” and “mediation” 
when both are court processes conducted by judicial officers.145 Professor 
Peter Robinson, who surveyed judges for a study of settlement practices in 
California, found that the judges did draw a distinction between the two 
processes, at least in terms of labels.146 Questions designed to elucidate the 
differences, however, revealed that judges who engaged in both settlement 
conferences and mediation described a substantial overlap in the techniques 
they used in the two settings.147  
The picture that emerges from recent accounts of judges’ approaches to 
settlement in these two contexts is one of some convergence between the 
                                                                                                                     
& Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH 
COST LITIG. 31 (1996), and Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not 
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937 (1997), with John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator 
Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 70 (1996), and Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible 
Concept of the Mediator’s Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949 (1997). 
 144 See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of 
“Good Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 69 (1991). 
In an observational study comparing settlement proceedings conducted by sitting and 
retired judges, Stacy Lee Burns concluded that their practices were “much more similar 
than different,” BURNS, supra note 135, at 210, and she labeled both processes as “judicial 
mediation.” Burns found that these processes, whether conducted by sitting or retired 
judges, are characterized by “active and directive intervention” with judges drawing on 
their “substantive legal expertise and persuasiveness.” Id.  
The differences Burns did observe between settlement conferences conducted by 
sitting judges and mediation conducted privately by retired judges stemmed primarily from 
differences between the public court and private institutional settings. For example, private 
judicial mediators were able to devote more time to the process and were overall more 
cordial and patient, while judicial time and resources were limited in the public system and 
judges could not spend time with cases that were not likely to settle. Id. at 211. 
 145 Edward J. Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 238 
(2002/2003) (observing that there is little difference between judicial mediation and a 
settlement conference); see also Baer, supra note 122, at 146 (stating that both mediation 
and settlement conferences “involve the judge’s recommendation as to an appropriate 
resolution”).  
 146 They overwhelmingly reported that they call their settlement activity a “settlement 
conference” rather than “mediation.” Robinson, supra note 122, at 358. 
 147 Id. at 373–78. These findings were limited by the sample size, see id., and when 
judges did report differences in their approaches to the two processes, they were consistent 
with Wissler’s characterizations of mediation verses settlement conferences. See supra 
notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
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processes,148 but with significant variation149 that seems to depend largely on 
individual style and training.150 Notwithstanding the judges who identify 
themselves as facilitators, many judges believe that lawyers and parties want 
an evaluation.151 And certainly judges’ adjudicatory experience can predispose 
them to an evaluative role.152 A judge’s approach may also reflect the stage of 
the settlement talks. Several judges, for example, describe beginning a 
conference with a facilitative approach and moving toward a more evaluative 
mode.153  
It appears that facilitative mediation has become a more important part of 
the mix of approaches that parties encounter in judicial settlement processes, 
but it coexists with a more traditional conception of an evaluative, and even 
directive, settlement judge. This coexistence has two consequences for the 
regulation of these processes. First, it does not make sense to regulate judicial 
                                                                                                                     
 148 Professor Robinson concluded that California general civil trial court judges were 
less directive and had a broader focus during settlement conferences than generally 
expected. Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge—Legal Lion or Problem Solving 
Lamb: An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices and 
Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113, 124–39 (2009). 
 149 Judge Cratsley’s interviews with superior court judges in Massachusetts revealed 
dramatically different approaches to settlement. Cratsley, supra note 117, at 5–6; see also 
Agnes, supra note 82, at 265, 282 (describing variations in number of settlements, timing 
of settlements, and quality of settlement processes); Jonathan M. Hyman & Milton 
Heumann, Minitrials and Matchmakers: Styles of Conducting Settlement Conferences, 80 
JUDICATURE 123 (1996) (contrasting approaches to settlement used by New Jersey judges). 
 150 Moreover, judicial styles are not necessarily static; some judges report that they 
have changed their approach over time. See, e.g., LaMar, supra note 128, at 14 (describing 
the evolution of her settlement process to involve clients, joint sessions, and expression of 
emotions). 
 151 Compare, for example, Judge Polster’s description of himself as “a facilitator” in 
mediation, Miller, supra note 128, at 38 (quoting Judge Polster), with Professor Brunet’s 
observation that most judges who mediate use primarily an evaluative style, Brunet, supra 
note 145, at 235. 
 152 Klein, supra note 128, at 784–85; see also Aldisert, supra note 38, at 248 
(observing that many cases involve a disagreement on value, not facts, and “I am usually 
asked my suggestion of value and I have no hesitation in offering my ideas”); Baer, supra 
note 122, at 136 (describing how caucuses can provide a judge with a view of the 
appropriate resolution of the case, the “hallmark” of evaluative mediation); Brown, supra 
note 137, at 9 (asserting that many judges and lawyers believe evaluative techniques 
contribute to settling as many cases as possible); Crane, supra note 122, at 21 (retired 
judge observing that parties who hired him as a mediator expected an opinion on the 
merits). But see Dein, supra note 126 (expressing hesitancy to predict outcomes based on 
the limited information available to her in mediation); Otis & Reiter, supra note 81, at 369 
(urging that in Canada a judge-mediator should refrain from expressing any opinion on the 
legal merits). 
 153 Morton Denlow, Breaking Impasses in Settlement Conferences: Five Techniques 
for Resolution, JUDGES’ J., Fall 2000, at 4, 6; Judicial Mediation of Cases Assigned to the 
Judge for Trial: Magistrate Judges Celeste F. Bremer and Karen K. Klein Interviewed by 
Wayne D. Brazil, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2011, at 24, 25 [hereinafter Brazil Interview] 
(interview of Judge Bremer); Klein, supra note 128, at 785.  
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involvement in mediation and settlement conferences separately, as is now 
typically done in local federal rules.154 Second, any form of regulation must 
take into account the great variation in styles and approaches that judges 
deploy as neutrals in these processes. While evaluative techniques emphasize 
predictions and suggestions that flow from the neutral to the attorneys and 
parties, use of facilitative techniques mean that information flows in the 
opposite direction.155 This information is different in kind from the knowledge 
about a case that a judge ordinarily gains as part of pretrial management, in 
deciding pretrial motions, and at trial. And it can come from an additional 
source—the parties—as well as the attorneys.156 As a consequence, the 
increased popularity of mediation makes settlement by adjudicative judges 
more problematic.  
The current version of Rule 16157 accommodates this variety of judicial 
approaches and settlement styles by its silence on this matter, which translates 
into granting judges nearly complete discretion for conducting settlement 
proceedings. The Rule 16 framework continues to blend authorizations for 
disparate judicial functions related to settlement. This extends the discretion 
associated with pretrial management to the role of settlement neutral, allowing 
judicial officers to host a settlement conference or mediate even when 
assigned to the case. 
                                                                                                                     
 154 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 155 See supra text accompanying note 138; infra text accompanying notes 230–32. 
 156 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
 157 After stylistic revisions in 2007, the pertinent part of Rule 16 now reads: 
Rule 16. Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management 
(a) PURPOSES OF A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. In any action, the court may order the 
attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences 
for such purposes as: 
 . . . . 
(5) facilitating settlement. 
 . . . . 
 (c) ATTENDANCE AND MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION AT A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE.  
(1) Attendance. A represented party must authorize at least one of its 
attorneys to make stipulations and admissions about all matters that can 
reasonably be anticipated for discussion at a pretrial conference. If appropriate, 
the court may require that a party or its representative be present or reasonably 
available by other means to consider possible settlement.  
(2) Matters for Consideration. At any pretrial conference, the court may 
consider and take appropriate action on the following matters: 
 . . . . 
(I) settling the case and using special procedures to assist in resolving 
the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule . . . . 
FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
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III. NEUTRAL ROLES: WHEN A DECIDER BECOMES A SETTLER 
The following section starts in Part III.A by examining the benefits of 
judicially-led settlement, but then distinguishes settlements led by an assigned 
judge from those led by other judicial officers. In Part III.B, it explains why 
the blending of adjudicatory and settlement functions is problematic for two 
reasons: the potential for coercion in settlement and the dangers of 
undermining the impartiality at the heart of our adjudicatory values. These 
risks are exacerbated by the trend toward the use of facilitative mediation 
techniques by judges. The concerns are expressed by attorneys with 
experience in judicial settlement and by some judges, as well as by academics. 
Crucially, they are supported by modern scientific understandings of cognition 
and decisionmaking processes, which are outlined in Part III.C.  
A. The Advantages of Judicially-Led Settlement 
There can be distinct advantages to settlement conducted by a judicial 
officer. An individual judge may have a reputation for wisdom and fairness,158 
and these traits also tend to be imputed in general terms from the “gravitas” of 
the judge’s position and respect for the moral authority and integrity 
associated with the impartiality and independence of their office.159 Other 
advantages stem from the legal acumen and experience that a judge brings to a 
settlement process.160 These factors do not compensate for lack of skill,161 but 
                                                                                                                     
 158 Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange 
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 356–57 (1986) (describing the importance of respect for 
and confidence in the judge in the negotiation of settlement in the Agent Orange case). 
 159 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 145, at 237; Candy Wagahoff Dale, Judicially 
Supervised Alternative Dispute Resolution: Perspectives from a Magistrate Judge, FED. 
LAW., May 2009, at 47, 59; Katz, supra note 135, at 3; Jarrod B. Martin, A User’s Guide to 
Bankruptcy Meditation and Settlement Conferences, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 
185, 192 (2009); Miller, supra note 128, at 33 (quoting Judge Polster); Otis & Reiter, 
supra note 81, at 365; Zampano, supra note 137, at 4. 
 160 See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 135, at 208–10 (describing legal content in mediations 
conducted by judges: legal reasoning; argumentation; precedent; knowledge of local juries, 
judges, court procedures, and outcomes in similar cases); Dein, supra note 126 (describing 
advantages of experience in the courtroom for her role as a mediator); Marcus, supra note 
15, at 1592 (noting that settlement conferences provide the parties with the “insights of an 
experienced outsider about the strengths and weaknesses of a case”). 
 161 Claudia L. Bernard, Is a Robe Ever Enough? Judicial Authority and Mediation Skill 
on Appeal, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2011, at 16, 17 (arguing that a judge’s status and 
authority do not trump skill and experience as a mediator); Stephen B. Goldberg et al., 
What Difference Does a Robe Make? Comparing Mediators With and Without Prior 
Judicial Experience, NEGOT. J., July 2009, at 277, 277 (finding that the capacity of a 
mediator to gain the confidence of the disputants was the most important factor in 
attorneys’ judgments about why a mediator is successful). 
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judges who combine skill with the attributes of their position can be 
particularly effective settlement neutrals.162 
Judges carry special credibility for functions that draw on legal analysis 
and expertise: evaluating the value of a case, analyzing parties’ positions, and 
predicting outcomes.163 Significantly, many lawyers see these activities as an 
important contribution toward settlement. Based on his survey of lawyers, 
Wayne Brazil characterized the strength of judges’ contribution as “skill in 
judging.”164 He concluded that “[l]awyers value penetrating, analytical 
exposition and thoughtful, objective, knowledgeable assessment. They want 
the judges’ opinions. They want the judges’ suggestions. They want the 
perspective of the experienced neutral.”165 Lawyers cite the benefits of a judge 
who provides a “reality check” for a client who has an inflated view of the 
strength of her case.166 Judges may also provide insights about the litigation 
process that a client may not have fully accepted even if he previously heard 
the same information from counsel.167 While any mediator may (and some 
routinely do) provide such information, explanations about the hurdles 
involved in proving a case or sobering assessments of its strength can be 
particularly effective coming from a sitting judge.168 A judge’s current, direct 
                                                                                                                     
 162 Alexander, supra note 118, at 652 (noting that the “primary reason why settlement 
conferences are so effective is the authority and expertise of the judge who conducts 
them”); Cratsley, supra note 122, at 574 (“[N]o one can dispute that a judge has the 
greatest standing and resources to promote settlement.”). 
 163 In Professor Wissler’s study of attorneys’ views of settlement neutrals, judges were 
seen as having more “credibility regarding settlement considerations” than court staff 
mediators, private mediators, or volunteer mediators. Wissler, supra note 137, at 292, 293 
tbl.7; see also Brunet, supra note 145, at 239 (noting the “evaluative legitimacy” of 
judges); Pyle, supra note 137, at 21 (stressing the advantage of a “credible evaluator” in a 
settlement conference). But see Dein, supra note 126 (judge noting that when she serves as 
a mediator she has limited information and no sense of the witnesses, and is therefore loath 
to make predictions). 
 164 BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 45. 
 165 Id. Judges also consider these activities as important for encouraging settlement. 
See Hogan, supra note 129, at 450; Zampano, supra note 137, at 69. There is some 
empirical evidence to support these views. See Bobbi McAdoo et al., Institutionalization: 
What Do Empirical Studies Tell Us About Court Mediation?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 
2003, at 8, 9 (reporting that cases are more likely to settle and litigants are more likely to 
assess mediation as fair when mediators disclose their view on the merits or value of a 
case). 
 166 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 159, at 192; see also Hogan, supra note 129, at 449 
(opining that judges can ensure a realistic view of liability and damage issues). 
 167 Dale, supra note 159, at 59 (citing example of providing information about burden 
of proof); Polster, supra note 122 (judge noting that clients will accept information from 
him when they were unwilling to listen to their attorney).  
 168 Crane, supra note 122, at 20–21; Dale, supra note 159, at 47; Martin, supra note 
159, at 192; see also Goldberg et al., supra note 161, at 288 (finding that lawyers rate 
evaluation skills as more important to the success of former-judge mediators than nonjudge 
mediators).  
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experience with local juries and motions outcomes heightens confidence in her 
predictions.169 
In addition to the advantages of their informed legal analysis, the 
participation of a judge also offers the possibility of some psychological 
benefits. Many judges believe that, for some clients, an ADR session with a 
sitting judge can provide a satisfactory substitute for having a day in court.170 
Observers also credit the participation of a sitting judge with beneficial effects 
on litigants’ behavior.171 Attorneys may act more constructively when there is 
a chance that they will appear before the judge in the future.172 
Finally, a judge’s participation as a settlement neutral can promote the 
interests of justice. Support for court settlement programs is consistent with a 
vision of courts as public institutions that provide services to help parties 
resolve their disputes in a holistic manner.173 ADR programs that rely on 
referrals to outside mediators or other neutrals impose costs that litigants do 
not incur when a court provides the settlement process. Furthermore, when 
settlement neutrals are judicial officers, at least some observers credit them 
with using their skills and powers to achieve substantive outcomes in 
settlement that promote the interest of justice,174 that the parties think are 
fairer than an imposed decision,175 and that may serve the parties’ needs and 
interests better than adjudication.176 
Many of these real advantages of judicial settlement or mediation can be 
achieved with a separate settlement judge—one who is not assigned for 
pretrial development or to preside at trial. Some do argue that a judge’s 
contribution is stronger if the settlement effort is led by the assigned judge.177 
For example, there are judges who believe that parties are more likely to feel 
they have had a true “day in court” when they can tell their story to “their” 
                                                                                                                     
 169 For example, with a jury trial, a sitting judge has credibility in predicting how a 
local jury will react to a case, or in highlighting the unpredictability of jury deliberations. 
Campbell Killefer, Wrestling with the Judge Who Wants You to Settle, LITIGATION, Spring 
2009, at 17, 19. Some commentators believe that current local knowledge gives sitting 
judges credibility that even retired judges lack. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 137, at 8; 
Dale, supra note 159, at 47. But see BURNS, supra note 135, at 209 (citing use of 
“experience-based local knowledge” by both sitting and retired judge-mediators). 
 170 Crane, supra note 122, at 22; Dale, supra note 159, at 47; Lynch, supra note 58, at 
58; Miller, supra note 128, at 33 (quoting Judge Polster). 
 171 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 159, at 192–93. 
 172 Id. at 193. 
 173 See Brazil, supra note 138, at 240–41. 
 174 Elliott, supra note 46, at 325. But see Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a 
New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 92 (2003) (questioning whether judicial intervention 
promotes fair settlement or merely promotes settlement). 
 175 Hogan, supra note 129, at 436. 
 176 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 504. 
 177 See, e.g., Craver, supra note 123, at 42 (noting the argument that settlement 
participants are more conciliatory and less likely to exaggerate the strength of their case 
with the judge assigned for trial because they don’t want to appear obstinate before the 
future decisionmaker). 
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judge.178 However the parties’ perception that they have been heard is likely 
enhanced only incrementally when the assigned judge serves as the settlement 
judge, especially if the alternative is a judicial officer from the same court.179 
The more significant advantage of settlement by an assigned judge, and 
the strongest argument against referral to another judicial officer, is probably 
informational.180 A judge who has ruled on pretrial motions and discovery 
issues has personal knowledge of the facts, the parties, and counsel that a 
colleague on the court cannot possess at the start of a settlement process.181 
This familiarity increases the efficiency of settlement182 and may make the 
assigned judge more accurate in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of 
the case.183 The informational argument loses force, however, if settlement 
occurs early in the case before extensive pretrial activity.184 Moreover, the 
possible gains in efficiency when an assigned judge serves as settlement judge 
must be weighed against the very substantial risks. 
B. Risks of Judicially-Led Settlement 
There are risks to judicially-led settlement. And those risks are 
exacerbated when the settlement judge is also the managerial/adjudicatory 
judge. This Part presents arguments that these roles are in conflict and should 
be separated. First, the potential for coercion due to the behavior of the 
settlement neutral is greatly heightened when the parties will return to that 
neutral for pretrial and trial decisions. Second, there are dangers for both the 
settlement and decisionmaking processes. Either a party must forgo 
                                                                                                                     
 178 Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 27 (quoting Judge Klein); Polster, supra note 
122. 
 179 Moreover, while “being heard” is an important element of a sense of procedural 
justice, it is probably related more to the behavior of a neutral than to her judicial status. 
See, e.g., Goldberg et al., supra note 161, at 298 (“The authority of the robe was sometimes 
a substitute for keen listening and creativeness and former judges therefore may not have 
developed these skills as well because they haven’t had to when they had the authority of 
the robe . . . .” (omission in original) (quoting survey respondent)). 
 180 See Brunet, supra note 145, at 257. 
 181 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 512 (attributing some of a judge’s 
settlement authority to the judge’s “power, control, or knowledge of the specific case”). 
 182 Polster, supra note 122 (emphasizing the judge’s understanding of a case obtained 
from the case management conference and the limited time available to prepare for 
settlement of a case on another judge’s docket); see also Miller, supra note 128, at 35 
(“There’s a lot of work that goes into a successful mediation . . . .” (quoting Judge 
McCarthy)); Polster, supra note 122 (emphasizing the importance of preparation for 
credibility); Zampano, supra note 137, at 4 (stressing need for the judge to be familiar with 
the case). 
 183 Evaluation and prediction by an assigned judge has been endorsed as providing a 
signaling function that can inform parties’ assessment of their prospects at trial. Brunet, 
supra note 145, at 234. 
 184 See generally JOHN LANDE, LAWYERING WITH PLANNED EARLY NEGOTIATION (2d 
ed. 2015). 
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participating fully in settlement by revealing information that could be 
instrumental, or it must accept the risk of impaired neutrality in adjudication if 
the case does not settle.  
1. The Potential for Coercion 
The potential for coercion was the original source of hesitation about a 
judicial role in settlement,185 and it continues to be a frequent objection 
today.186 A sense of being coerced into settling is in the eye of the parties and 
their attorneys, and there are two potential sources: judicial behaviors during 
settlement and pretrial decisions and management designed to encourage 
settlement.  
When considering judicial behavior, it is helpful to remember that the role 
of a judge in the adjudication process is by its nature directive.187 This 
personal experience, combined with the predilections of some judges, can lead 
them to be forceful arm twisters.188 Such behavior on the part of any 
settlement neutral can threaten the parties’ self-determination, but there is a 
heightened danger when the behavior comes from a judge: the authority of the 
office accompanies a judge even in an informal process such as a settlement 
conference or mediation.189 The gravitas that can be a positive source of 
credibility for a judge leading a settlement process can, when misused, turn the 
judge into a coercive authority figure in the parties’ eyes.190 
The potential for coercion is elevated many fold when the arm twisting, or 
even less forceful encouragement, comes from a judge who will have 
decisional power over the case if it does not settle.191 This stems from parties’ 
                                                                                                                     
 185 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 186 See Brunet, supra note 145, at 248 (stating that the most common criticism of 
judicial settlement is that judges can be “overly coercive”). 
 187 See, e.g., Goldberg et al., supra note 161, at 298 (“Because they’ve been judges, 
they’re used to being able to tell you what to do and what not to do.” (quoting a survey 
respondent, describing a retired-judge mediator)). 
 188 Alfini, supra note 144, at 68–71 (describing “bashing” mediators, who are often 
retired judges); Brown, supra note 137, at 9 (acknowledging that judges’ approach can be 
“rough” and observing that this can have a negative effect on clients’ views of the civil 
justice system); Brunet, supra note 145, at 248; Marcus, supra note 15, at 1592 (noting 
instances when judges use “rather firm techniques of persuasion to obtain agreements”). 
 189 See Otis & Reiter, supra note 81, at 367 (observing that maintaining party self-
determination is a special challenge for judges, “since they will always remain judges in 
the eyes of the parties,” even in the “informal setting” of mediation). 
 190 See Floyd, supra note 10, at 90 (“[T]he judge’s position, as opposed to the 
particular action of the judge, may have coercive effect.”). 
 191 Crane, supra note 122, at 22 (noting that the “environment is inherently coercive” 
when a settlement conference is conducted by the judge who will have power over the case 
at trial); see also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(b)(3) cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003) 
(recognizing “concern that party autonomy in mediation may be constrained either by the 
direct coercion of a judicial officer who may make a subsequent ruling on the matter, or by 
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natural fears that the judge’s subsequent rulings might be influenced by their 
failure to cooperate with the judge.192 Judges are under great docket pressure, 
and parties worry that repercussions could follow when the judge knows a 
party rejected a settlement backed by the judge.193 Defenders of a dual role for 
judges as a neutral, both in settlement and at trial, reject this specter of 
retribution as an unrealistic fear that underestimates judges’ understanding of 
their role.194 But even if judges are able to see the parties’ failure to settle in 
completely benign terms, a party’s perception may be very different.195 When 
a judge has urged settlement forcefully, a party may understandably interpret 
settlement as being important to that judge.  
More generally, judges’ perceptions of their behaviors are not always 
aligned with the reactions of attorneys and parties.196 Actions that a judge may 
regard as merely supportive of settlement may nonetheless be perceived as 
pressure on a party due to the judge’s position of power over the case.197 For 
example, a judge’s pride in his “assertive” style, which he believes promotes 
settlement in difficult cases, can blind him to the risk that he is imposing 
settlement coercively.198 
It is impossible to assess accurately the degree to which parties perceive 
judges as unduly forceful in settlement, but there are too many troubling 
accounts of behavior that, even if only isolated instances, could be coercive.199 
                                                                                                                     
the indirect coercive effect that inherently inures from the parties’ knowledge of the 
ultimate presence of that judge”). 
 192 Crane, supra note 122, at 22; Welsh, supra note 142, at 67. 
 193 Brunet, supra note 145, at 247; Frey, supra note 136, at 760; Longan, supra note 
126, at 736–37. 
 194 Hogan, supra note 129, at 439 (“[J]udges who understand and use successful 
intervention tactics in the negotiation process would [not] blame one particular party for a 
case not settling.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Baer, supra note 122, at 148 (commenting 
that it is “demeaning . . . to suggest . . . that the judge cannot be fair regardless of the result 
of the mediation”). 
 195 See Molot, supra note 174, at 93 (arguing that a party urged by a judge to settle has 
an incentive to avoid proceeding before a potentially hostile judge); Schuck, supra note 
158, at 359–61 (warning of judicial overreaching and the danger that lawyers will interpret 
judicial involvement in settlement as coercion). 
 196 D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 92 
(1986) (“Settlement-oriented judges . . . tend to resist the idea that judicial involvement in 
the settlement process might be coercive.”). 
 197 Alfini, supra note 119, at 13; Brian J. Shoot & Christopher T. McGrath, “Don’t 
Come Back Without a Reasonable Offer:” Surprisingly Little Direct Authority Guides How 
Judges Can Move Parties, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., May 2004, at 28, 34. 
 198 See Dodds v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal. 1995) 
(concluding that judge’s interruptions and unprovoked displays of anger “exceed[ed] his 
proper role and cast[] disrepute on the judicial office”); see also Peskin v. Peskin, 638 A.2d 
849, 858 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (finding comments that were likely intended to 
force a decision on whether or not to settle instead “unquestionably had the effect of 
coercing defendant into agreeing to settle”). 
 199 See, e.g., Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding 
fine levied for reaching settlement after court’s deadline was coercive); Crane, supra note 
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Consider the judge who reportedly instructed plaintiff’s counsel to “tell his 
client he’d better settle or there would be ‘reverse interest’ if the damage 
award was lower.”200 Or the judge who threatened contempt and warned that 
he would take defendant’s refusal to settle into account in considering any fee 
application.201 Then there was the judge who allegedly threatened to report a 
party to the ethics committee if the mediation did not succeed.202 Even less 
explicit threats, such as an admonition to settle “because I can guarantee you 
much pain,”203 or a judge’s antagonistic reaction to counsel’s statement that 
mediation would not “work out right now,”204 can be interpreted as coercive. 
The potential coercion in all these instances, and the interference with the 
parties’ autonomy and self-determination in settlement, arises because the 
judge will become the decisionmaker if the case does not settle.205 
There can also be an important link between actions a judge takes in her 
pretrial management role—whether for the purpose of encouraging settlement 
or not—and a perception of coercion to settle.206 Tight scheduling timetables 
or the timing of decisions on pretrial motions are often interpreted as ways to 
increase pressure to settle.207 Preliminary rulings can increase or decrease 
                                                                                                                     
122, at 22 (reporting a judicial settlement technique “that amounts to little more than 
outright bludgeoning”); Cratsley, supra note 122, at 575 (stating that several state 
disciplinary counsel reported complaints of judicial coercion and intimidation in settlement 
conferences); Miller, supra note 128, at 37 (acknowledging that there are judicial officers 
who “are not thoughtful and principled about the pressure that they exert, both in fact and 
in perception, when they push for settlement”); Shoot & McGrath, supra note 197, at 33–
34 (describing “arm twisting” judges in settlement); see also supra note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
 200 Hyman & Heumann, supra note 149, at 125.  
 201 Peskin, 638 A.2d at 858. 
 202 In re Estate of Romero, No. CA2006-06-015, 2007 WL 1310192, *8 (Ohio Ct. 
App. May 7, 2007). 
 203 Cont’l Ins. Co. v. First Wyo. Bank, 771 P.2d 374, 376 (Wyo. 1989) (order vacating 
judgment and redirecting reassignment of case) (quoting the district court). 
 204 Trahan v. Lone Star Title Co. of El Paso, 247 S.W.3d 269, 275 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 205 When a judge has forcefully or repeatedly urged settlement, comments that seem to 
attribute the failure to one party can lead to impressions of biased decisions. See, e.g., 
Davidson v. Lindsey, 104 S.W.3d 483, 488–92 (Tenn. 2003) (rejecting claims of bias when 
judge denied defendant’s motion for new trial after repeatedly remonstrating attorneys 
about the failure to settle). 
 206 See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 KAN. L. 
REV. 849, 855 (describing the “misconception” that “case management is a process by 
which judges push reluctant parties to settle”). 
 207 See, e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 75, 79 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding order that accelerated the date of an expert’s deposition when 
one purpose was to facilitate settlement); Amanda Bronstad, Pelvic Mesh Maker Bets on 
Trials; Unlike Other Defendants, Ethicon Isn’t Blinking, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 11, 2016, at 1, 1 
(describing pressure to settle from judge scheduling a consolidated trial of thirty-seven 
cases). 
112 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
uncertainty in ways designed to encourage settlement.208 Prospective decisions 
that rest with the court’s discretion and are of great importance to the 
lawyers—ranging from class certification to discovery decisions to 
admissibility of expert testimony—give the judge subtle and implicit leverage 
over the lawyers, who want the judge to view them as reasonable and 
cooperative.209 Using judicial decisions to create motivation to settle can be 
abused, or perceived to be abused, by a judge who is enthusiastically 
promoting settlement.210 
Unfortunately, mechanisms to remedy coercive judicial settlement 
behavior are not effective in practical terms. One problem is definitional. 
Courts consistently agree that a judge may not coerce or force a settlement,211 
and some condemn even the appearance of coercion.212 Yet judges have 
abundant discretion in settlement, and the boundaries of appropriate judicial 
involvement are hazy. While the stricture against coercion in settlement may 
be clear at the extreme,213 the line at which a judicial practice crosses from 
(acceptably) encouraging a settlement to (unacceptably) coercing one is 
certainly not bright.214 
A second set of problems is procedural.215 Critical or even hostile remarks 
made during judicial proceedings ordinarily do not require recusal unless they 
stem from an extrajudicial source or are especially extreme.216 Standards for 
recusal are difficult to meet; unless a judge learns information outside of court 
proceedings, he must display such a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” 
that fair judgment would be impossible.217 Even when a judge’s comments are 
                                                                                                                     
 208 Schuck, supra note 158, at 351–53 (discussing how preliminary rulings in the 
complex Agent Orange case assisted settlement: a decision precluding punitive damages 
reduced uncertainty about the stakes of the case, while key choice-of-law decisions 
increased uncertainty about its outcome). 
 209 Id. at 358–59 (attributing lawyers’ cooperation in settlement to “professional norms 
and strategic concerns”). 
 210 Id. at 360–61 (describing attorneys’ allegations of improper pressure by Judge 
Weinstein to achieve settlement in the Agent Orange case). 
 211 See, e.g., Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1129 (3d Cir. 1990); Kothe v. 
Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985); In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Wolff v. Laverne, Inc., 233 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (App. Div. 1962) (per curiam). 
 212 See, e.g., In re Ashcroft, 888 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
 213 See, e.g., Goss Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 267 F.3d 624, 627–28 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (reversing dismissal of suit imposed as a sanction due to parties’ failure to 
settle); Kothe, 771 F.2d at 669–70 (condemning coercion and reversing a sanction imposed 
when a case settled at trial after the insurance carrier agreed to pay the same amount the 
judge had recommended weeks earlier). 
 214 Floyd, supra note 10, at 83; Shoot & McGrath, supra note 197, at 34; Tornquist, 
supra note 50, at 752. 
 215 See generally Elliott, supra note 46, at 329–33 (criticizing active case management 
for lack of procedural safeguards); Resnik, supra note 1, at 424–35 (same). 
 216 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553–55 (1994). 
 217 Id. at 555. 
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motivated by “settlement fever,” they do not justify disqualification.218 
Moreover, the decision to press a disqualification motion is a daunting 
prospect for a party who will later be appearing before that same judge if the 
motion fails.219 Finally, there is little opportunity for review of a judge’s 
settlement activity.220 It is an informal process that usually takes place off the 
record, often in the privacy of the judge’s chambers. As with much pretrial 
judicial activity, there are few procedural paths to an appellate court.221 
2. The Dilemma of Risk to Impartiality or Risk of Reticence 
Many of the participants in the debate on judicial settlement have also 
expressed concern about a second danger that arises when the judicial officer 
leading the settlement will resume or assume a decisionmaking role if 
settlement is unsuccessful: the effect of the judge’s experience as settlement 
neutral on the capacity of the judge as adjudicator. The argument has been 
traditionally framed as one of bias or partiality: that involvement in settlement 
makes it difficult for a judge to maintain her neutrality about the case.222 As 
stated by James Alfini, “The judge qua settlement agent may very well have 
formed opinions or impressions about the case that are inappropriate for the 
judge qua adjudicator.”223 
For a traditional settlement conference that involves an evaluative 
approach, one of the primary criticisms of a judge presiding in a case she has 
tried to settle is that, by conveying her assessment of the case or suggestions 
for settlement options to the parties, she formed a preliminary judgment about 
the outcome that may trigger a tendency toward making subsequent judgments 
consistent with her initial views.224 This criticism has support from modern 
understandings of the effect of tentative opinions on cognitive functioning.225 
Conversely, a decision that is inconsistent with the prior views a judge 
expressed as a devil’s advocate in caucus may equally cause a party to 
                                                                                                                     
 218 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 219 Floyd, supra note 10, at 83. 
 220 Id. at 82–83. 
 221 Either the situation must qualify for mandamus, or there must be an appealable 
order in the trial court (such as a sanctions order or dismissal) to provide a vehicle to 
challenge inappropriate settlement behavior. Id. at 82. Ironically, when coercion to settle is 
effective, the case is closed, leaving no avenue to raise an objection. Id. at 82–83. 
 222 Resnik, supra note 1, at 426–31; Tornquist, supra note 50, at 771–72; see also 
Elliott, supra note 46, at 327. 
 223 Alfini, supra note 119, at 13. 
 224 See, e.g., Cratsley, supra note 122, at 581; cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System 
(“An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating th[e] natural 
human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully 
known.”), in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 44 (Harold J. Berman ed., rev. ed. 1971). 
 225 See infra text accompanying notes 305–07. 
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question that judge’s impartiality.226 Yet, courts disagree as to whether taking 
a position on the merits of a case during an unsuccessful settlement conference 
creates an appearance of bias, leaving recusal uncertain.227 
When the criticism is framed, in this way, as a concern with the judge’s 
formulation of a premature evaluation of the case, one possible solution is that 
assigned judges should avoid making predictions or suggestions in 
settlement.228 Under this view, using facilitative mediation, rather than the 
evaluative approach associated with traditional settlement conferences, can 
alleviate the problem of bias because the judge avoids making predictions and 
providing suggestions for outcomes.229 From this perspective, the trend toward 
judges’ increased use of facilitative mediation is good news that reduces the 
danger to their subsequent neutrality as decisionmakers.  
I believe that the opposite is true, and that the growth of judicial mediation 
poses new dangers for impartiality in subsequent decisionmaking. Although 
judges who adopt the role of a facilitative mediator are not as likely to evaluate 
the case for the parties, a facilitative approach to mediation tends to rely 
heavily on parties sharing information with each other and with the 
mediator.230 Moreover, many mediators have conversations with the parties 
separately in caucuses and take on the role of an intermediary between 
them.231 This intermediary role depends entirely on information gained in 
those private conversations.232 The danger to impartiality is the extensive 
                                                                                                                     
 226 See Kearny v. Milwaukee County, No. 05-C-834, 2007 WL 3171395, at *2 (E.D. 
Wis. Oct. 26, 2007) (order of recusal) (magistrate judge recusing himself from presiding in 
a case he previously mediated). 
 227 Compare United States v. Pfizer Inc., 560 F.2d 319, 322–23 (8th Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam) (proposing that a settlement figure creates appearance of bias requiring judge’s 
recusal for a bench trial), and First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Rice Lake v. Klapmeier, 526 F.2d 
77, 80 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (same), with Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1233–34 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (finding no appearance of bias when judge urged plaintiff in ex parte meeting to 
settle because judge could not rule in his favor), and Smith v. Sentry Ins., 752 F. Supp. 
1058, 1061–62 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (denying recusal request based on judge’s comments on 
the merits of plaintiff’s case during a settlement conference). Moreover, again, there are 
also procedural barriers to success with a motion to recuse or disqualify. See Floyd, supra 
note 10, at 83–84. 
 228 See, e.g., Kearny, 2007 WL 3171395, at *2 (opining that the ethical obligations of a 
presiding judge “limit[] the judge’s ability to speak candidly”). 
 229 Robinson, supra note 122, at 372–73; see also Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 
26 (Judge Klein expressing the view that parties are less likely to fear that settlement will 
color subsequent rulings if a judge uses a facilitative approach, whereas a highly evaluative 
style raises questions about a judge’s ability to remain neutral). 
 230 See generally DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF 
MEDIATION 165–206 (2d ed. 2012) (exploring the importance of expanding information 
during mediation and discussing techniques for doing so). 
 231 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for 
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 325–28 (1994). 
 232 Often a mediator does not convey the information explicitly to the other side, but 
instead engages in a process of “noisy translations.” Id. at 328. 
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amount of information—unfiltered by the rules of evidence—that judges 
obtain during informal mediation proceedings.233 While an evaluative 
approach poses problems when a judge communicates conclusions to the 
parties, the information that flows in the opposite direction in a facilitative 
process—from the parties to the judge—poses its own risks to adjudicative 
decisions.234 
The argument against connecting impaired impartiality with making 
suggestions and predictions or hearing sensitive information in settlement is 
that judges can compartmentalize their knowledge and ignore what they 
should not consider. In the words of one judge, judges are expected to separate 
their thoughts for separate rulings all the time.235 They hear both admissible 
and inadmissible information when they decide pretrial motions, make 
evidentiary rulings, and dispose of posttrial motions.236 The general 
presumption is that judges can be trusted to maintain impartiality by separating 
what they may appropriately consider from what they may not,237 and this 
presumption extends to what judges learn in settlement conferences.238 
Evidence that judges, like other humans, have difficulty disregarding 
irrelevant information suggests that this confidence may be misplaced.239 But 
even if we must accept, as a general matter, the risk that inadmissible 
information may affect decisions, the type of information conveyed in 
settlement discussions raises much more acute concerns. Stated simply, it is 
different in kind.240  
For judges functioning as mediators, information gathering from the 
parties is central to the process of reaching an agreement.241 Mediators do not 
just hear inadmissible information; they hear personal information, and they 
                                                                                                                     
 233 Professor Resnik argued that this was a more general problem associated with all 
pretrial proceedings. Resnik, supra note 1, at 426–27. 
 234 See infra notes 241–46 and accompanying text. 
 235 Hogan, supra note 129, at 439–40. 
 236 Id.; see also Cratsley, supra note 122, at 588 n.69. 
 237 See, e.g., Enter. Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 968 (Fla. 2001); Pizzuto v. 
State, 10 P.3d 742, 748 (Idaho 2000); Hite v. Haase, 729 N.E.2d 170, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., Advisory Opinion No. 95 (2009) 
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 95] (“Judges . . . periodically receive information that is 
not admissible and exclude it from their deliberations before rendering judgment. It is not 
unreasonable to credit their ability to be impartial in these circumstances.”), in 2B GUIDE 
TO JUDICIARY POLICY ch. 2, § 220, at 161, 162, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ 
vol02b-ch02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BTP-LKKL] (last revised Apr. 25, 2016). 
 238 Cratsley, supra note 122, at 583 n.49 (citing cases). For judicial expressions of 
confidence in this ability, see infra note 318. 
 239 See infra notes 293–99 and accompanying text. 
 240 Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 25 (quoting Judge Bremer stating that a judge 
is likely to learn about the parties’ interests, strategies, and the value their counsel places 
on the case). 
 241 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 230, at 169 (“If a resolution is to be achieved in 
mediation, both the parties and the mediator need far more and different information than a 
judge would need to decide a case.”). 
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hear it from parties as well as from their attorneys.242 To help the parties settle 
their dispute, it is important for a mediator to learn “about the parties’ feelings, 
motivations, relationships, values, standards and priorities—topics generally 
irrelevant to a judge.”243 It is commonplace, for example, for parties in 
meditation to describe their personal interests. For example, a mediator may 
learn why a party needs to settle quickly, or why a party needs a particular sum 
of money. And this is not dry information; parties often express their personal 
situation in emotional terms, which makes it especially salient and more 
accessible in the judge’s memory.244 A mediator is also likely to become privy 
to parties’ strategies, priorities, and trade-offs as she discusses their bargaining 
concessions.245 Moreover, in the course of these discussions she is bound to 
gain an impression of each party’s degree of cooperation and willingness to 
settle. Perhaps most significantly, the discussion is likely to cover extensively 
the attorneys’ assessments of their cases: their view of the most likely 
outcome, the litigation cost, and the bottom line for reaching an agreement. 
Indeed, it “would be difficult . . . to conduct a settlement conference without at 
some point dealing with the issue of value.”246 The key point is that exposure 
during settlement to the parties, to their strategies, and to the settlement value 
of a case go far beyond what judges usually learn in their adjudicatory and 
managerial roles.  
The potential effect of this knowledge on a judge’s subsequent 
decisionmaking needs to be taken seriously. As recognized in an American 
Bar Association (ABA) ethics opinion on settlement, such disclosure to the 
judge of a client’s settlement position significantly increases the potential for 
an unsatisfactory disposition of the case.247 The Judicial Conference’s 
Committee on Codes of Conduct concurs, concluding that information from 
settlement that is not likely to be presented at trial “may undermine the judge’s 
objectivity as a fact finder and give rise to questions about impartiality.”248 
Standards for recusal and disqualification are not, however, tailored for 
                                                                                                                     
 242 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 243 FRENKEL & STARK, supra note 230, at 169 (emphasis omitted).  
 244 JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION 
MAKING 73 (2012). 
 245 See Schauf v. Schauf, 107 P.3d 1237, 1245 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam) 
(recognizing need for disclosures of strategic strengths and weaknesses in mediation and 
the potential to “taint impartiality” of decisionmaker). 
 246 Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 25 (quoting Judge Bremer expressing special 
concern about settlement disclosures of case valuation). 
 247 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-370 (1993), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/YourABA/93_370.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2TM-75U8] (discussing judicial participation in pretrial 
settlement negotiations and concluding that a judge may ask a lawyer to disclose settlement 
limits authorized by the client and inquire about the lawyer’s advice on settlement terms, 
but that a lawyer may not reveal that information without informed client consent). 
 248 Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 237, at 162. 
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settlement and do not provide an effective vehicle for considering the effect of 
information from settlement on subsequent decisionmaking. While there are 
court decisions that condemn mediator reports to assigned judges or testimony 
that reveals information learned in mediation,249 such knowledge does not 
usually lead to disqualification of the judge.250 Even when a judge gains 
knowledge about what transpired in mediation directly from his role as the 
settlement neutral, the effect of that knowledge tends to be treated as 
benign.251 Courts have interpreted the federal statute on disqualification and 
recusal for bias or prejudice252 in light of the “extrajudicial source” 
doctrine.253 The judge’s favorable or unfavorable opinion must be wrongful 
either because it is “excessive in degree” or based on extrajudicial 
knowledge.254 This means the bias cannot be “derived from the evidence or 
conduct of the parties that the judge observes in the course of the 
                                                                                                                     
 249 E.g., Duininck Bros., Inc. v. Howe Precast, Inc., No. 4:06-cv-441, 2008 WL 
4411608, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2008) (order granting defendant’s motion to strike) 
(striking mediator as expert witness and noting that sensitive, highly relevant information 
was disclosed to the mediator on the understanding that it would facilitate settlement); VJL 
v. RED, 39 P.3d 1110, 1113 n.3 (Wyo. 2002) (reprimanding mediator for reporting on 
party’s behavior during mediation). But see Harkrader v. Farrar Oil Co., No. 2004-CA-
000114-MR, 2005 WL 1252379, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. May 27, 2005) (refusing to reverse a 
court order enforcing a settlement when trial court had considered an affidavit from a 
mediator). 
 250 E.g., Enter. Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 968 (Fla. 2001) (holding that a 
judge who learned of mediation settlement offers in violation of confidentiality statute was 
not disqualified); Metz v. Metz, 61 P.3d 383, 389 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that a judge who 
heard evidence about divorce mediation was not required to recuse). 
 251 See Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., 587 F. App’x 925, 933–34 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that a magistrate judge was not disqualified from issuing a report and recommendation in a 
case he had previously mediated); Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., 66 F. App’x 840, 842 
(10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a claim that it was improper for a magistrate judge who served 
as mediator to recommend that the contested settlement agreement be enforced); Rehkoph 
v. REMS, Inc., 40 F. App’x 126, 130 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no error when the trial judge 
acted as mediator and then decided motion for summary judgment); Garrett v. Delta Queen 
Steamboat Co., No. 05-1492-CJB-SS, 2007 WL 837177, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 14, 2007) 
(denying motion to recuse the magistrate judge based on argument that her involvement as 
mediator would cause her to be prejudiced and vested in enforcement of the contested 
settlement); DeMers v. Lee, 99 Wash. App. 1056 (Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam) (finding no 
violation of the appearance of fairness doctrine when the judge who presided at a 
settlement conference enforced the contested agreement). But see In re Disqualification of 
Unruh, 937 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (Ohio 2010) (ordering disqualification of trial judge who 
participated in mediation from evidentiary hearing on disputed settlement agreement 
because of the likelihood she would be called to testify about the agreement). 
 252 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2012).  
 253 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553–55 (1994). The same requirement for an 
extrajudicial source of bias has been applied in cases refusing to reverse decisions for 
alleged judicial bias in a decision. Floyd, supra note 10, at 72–74. 
 254 Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 814 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. 
at 550). 
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proceedings.”255 A judge’s knowledge acquired from participating in a 
settlement proceeding is not “extrajudicial,” and thus does not necessitate 
recusal.256  
A party may choose to avoid the risk of sharing information that might 
affect future decisions of the neutral,257 but the cost of reticence can be high. 
The reason this information is shared is that it is helpful to the settlement 
process. Withholding it handicaps a mediator and very likely reduces the 
chances of settlement, or at least the responsiveness of the settlement to the 
party’s needs.258 Thus a party whose mediator is also the decisionmaker in a 
case faces a difficult choice: accept the risks to impartiality of sharing 
sensitive information with a looming trial, or risk a less effective settlement 
process.259  
3. From the Trenches: Attitudes of Attorneys 
The risks are also expressed by lawyers with reservations about a dual role 
for judges. Despite expressing a high degree of approval for a settlement 
judge’s participation in settlement negotiations, almost 60% of the lawyers 
who responded to Wayne Brazil’s study in the early 1980s felt it was improper 
for the judge assigned to conduct a bench trial to preside over a settlement 
process.260 The assignment for trial also had a strong effect on lawyers’ 
                                                                                                                     
 255 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 256 See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sunwest Mgmt., Inc., No. 09-6056-HO, 2009 
WL 1065053, at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 2009) (refusing to require recusal of presiding judge 
who had mediated a similar case with many of the same parties and citing cases), aff’d, 360 
F. App’x 826 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Floyd, supra note 10, at 68–72 (discussing cases in 
which courts rejected arguments that a judge should be disqualified for biased statements 
made during settlement conferences). 
 257 Some policies have drawn on the assumption that lawyers and parties are likely to 
choose reticence. For example, the Uniform Mediation Act excluded from its coverage 
judicial conferences conducted by a judge who might make a ruling in the case in part 
because the drafters believed that parties were not likely to be candid with a judge during 
such a mediation, and thus the confidentiality protections of the Act were unnecessary. See 
SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 10.16, at 628 (2016–
2017 ed.). 
 258 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.  
 259 Cf. Ellen E. Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the Same 
Neutral: A Framework for Judicial Review, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 219, 224–25 
(2013). Lawyers may also be tempted to engage in other unproductive strategic behaviors, 
such as demanding excessive amounts to anchor a judge’s perception, see infra text 
accompanying notes 284–90, which can reduce the likelihood of reaching a settlement. See 
CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT § 16.14(2)(a) (8th 
ed. 2016) (opining that advocates would be “wise” to engage in anchoring when a 
settlement conference is conducted by a presiding judge, but noting that this will decrease 
the likelihood that the conference will lead to a settlement). 
 260 BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 84. Smaller, but substantial, percentages also disapproved 
in cases scheduled for a jury trial. Id. at 85–86 (reporting that more than 40% of lawyers 
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acceptance of judicial settlement techniques. For example, while the vast 
majority (86%) believed that, in general, it was proper for a settlement judge 
to suggest a dollar range for a reasonable settlement, the approval rate for this 
technique plummeted (to 30%) if the judge was assigned to the case for 
trial.261 
Brazil’s findings on lawyer preferences are consistent with a more recent 
study conducted by Roselle Wissler in the Southern District of Ohio that 
allowed a comparison of attorneys’ attitudes about settlement conferences 
conducted by judges assigned to try the case, and those who are not.262 While 
the lawyers’ first choice of process was mediation with court staff mediators, 
they voiced a statistically significant preference for settlement conferences 
with judges not assigned to the case as compared to conferences with assigned 
judges.263 The data suggest three reasons for this strong preference. First, the 
lawyers rated judges who were not assigned to the case equivalently or more 
highly than assigned judges on multiple dimensions, which suggests that they 
did not see any particular advantage to settlement with an assigned judge.264 
Second, and even more importantly, the lawyers thought judges assigned to 
the case for trial were much more biased than non-assigned judges.265 Third, 
they confirmed the problem of reticence; they thought that when settlement 
conferences were led by judges assigned to the case, parties were less able to 
discuss the case candidly and fully explore settlement options without possible 
negative consequences or prejudice to the ongoing litigation.266 Thus, lawyers 
                                                                                                                     
had reservations about settlement involvement by an assigned judge in cases to be tried by 
jury: 33% deemed this practice to be improper, while 9% were not sure about its propriety). 
 261 Id. at 85. Brazil found that the greatest antipathy for an assigned judge acting as a 
settlement neutral was in the district where lawyers had the most pronounced preference 
for active and assertive judicial involvement in settlement. Id. at 90–94. This led him to 
suggest that these attitudes were linked. Id. at 94. He speculated that because these lawyers 
wanted their settlement neutral to dig deeply into the case and express opinions, perhaps 
they therefore did not think this judge could then try the case with complete impartiality. 
Id. 
 262 Wissler, supra note 137, at 274–75. The study also compared lawyers’ views on 
these two forms of settlement conferences with their opinions on three types of mediation: 
court-connected mediation by court staff mediators, court-connected mediation by 
volunteer mediators, and mediation with private, paid mediators. Id. 
 263 Id. at 298–99, 298 tbl.12, 299 n.110. 
 264 Judges not assigned were seen as more likely to incorporate clients into the 
settlement process, to devote a sufficient amount of time to settlement, and to leave clients 
feeling well served regardless of the outcome. Id. at 310. The two types of judges were 
rated similarly on providing useful input, helping to manage difficult parties, responding in 
a timely manner, and making good use of parties’ resources. Id. The only advantage 
lawyers attributed to judges assigned to the case was more credibility regarding settlement 
considerations. Id.  
 265 Id. at 287 & tbl.3 & n.68. 
 266 Id. at 284–86, 284 n.57, 285 tbl.1 & n.60, 286 tbl.2. Similarly, in Brazil’s study, 
nearly two-thirds of the lawyers thought they would be less open in discussing settlement 
with the trial judge in a non-jury trial than with another judge. BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 
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experienced in settlement conferences expressed significant concerns about the 
participation of judges assigned to adjudicate the case.  
Similarly, in Brazil’s earlier study in other districts, overall the lawyers 
preferred facilitation by a separate settlement judge. This preference was based 
on concerns for propriety, but it was also coupled with a “positive overall 
assessment” of how much a separate settlement judge could contribute to the 
process.267 Brazil concluded that lawyers are “confident that courts can 
delegate responsibility to conduct settlement negotiations to settlement judges 
(not the assigned judges) without sacrificing the effectiveness of judicial 
intervention in this important process.”268 Both studies show that, in the 
lawyers’ eyes, the disadvantages and risks of judges’ participation in settling 
cases assigned to them for trial outweighed any extra effectiveness conferred 
by prior exposure to the case.  
C. Insights from Modern Science: The Decisionmaking Literature 
When Professor Resnik wrote her article, she speculated that pretrial 
management could lead to bias, but could only note that we still had much to 
learn about how prior knowledge affects the formation of opinions.269 In 
contrast, in today’s world a book on cognitive function has popular appeal, and 
there is widespread familiarity with the distinction between thought processes 
framed as “thinking fast” (automatic thinking) and “thinking slow” (careful 
deliberation).270 The concepts are so mainstream that an executive order 
encourages federal agencies to use behavioral science insights to improve 
policies and programs.271 These current understandings of the way humans 
think and make decisions are also relevant to the dynamics that occur when a 
single judicial officer serves as a neutral for both settlement and adjudicative 
decisions. They can provide new perspectives on the mental processes at work 
and shed important light on concerns about maintaining impartiality. 
Psychologists theorize that thinking and decisionmaking operate on two 
levels, which are often labeled System 1 and System 2.272 System 1 processes 
                                                                                                                     
92. This was especially true in northern California, where 80% of the respondents held this 
view. Id. 
 267 BRAZIL, supra note 59, at 85. 
 268 Id. at 84. 
 269 Resnik, supra note 1, at 427 & n.197. 
 270 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 271 Exec. Order No. 13707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56365 (Sept. 18, 2015). 
 272 Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: 
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 421, 436–38 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES]. Others have proposed two-process models that use different 
terminology and vary somewhat, but there is agreement on the general characteristics of 
the two systems. Id.  
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are “spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast.”273 They operate with “no 
sense of voluntary control.”274 System 2 processes, in contrast, are “deliberate, 
rule-governed, effortful, and slow.”275 They are associated with the exercise of 
“agency, choice, and concentration.”276 The two systems act in concert. 
System 1 (the automatic system) is the main source of impressions and 
feelings. These impressions and feelings fuel the “beliefs and deliberate 
choices of System 2” (the effortful system).277 System 2 can produce careful, 
systematic thought, but it also endorses many intuitive reactions derived from 
System 1 impressions, meaning that System 1 influences even careful 
decisions.278  
A model of judicial decisonmaking drawn from these insights by Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich “posits that judges make 
initial intuitive judgments (System 1), which they might (or might not) 
override with deliberation (System 2).”279 This cognitive conception of legal 
decisionmaking contemplates a fluid interaction between reasoning and more 
intuitive thinking: a judge may maintain her initial, quickly proposed solution, 
or may modify it after careful, systematic consideration.280  
When Guthrie and his co-authors tested their model on judges, they found 
that, like the rest of us, many of them make incorrect intuitive judgments about 
problems when the right conclusion requires deliberative reevaluation.281 They 
also asked judges to make decisions based on hypotheticals designed to match 
situations that judges commonly face. These experiments showed that, in 
many settings, judges rely on heuristics—mental shortcuts associated with 
System 1 thinking—that can produce systematic errors in judgment.282  
                                                                                                                     
 273 Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 272, at 49, 49. 
 274 KAHNEMAN, supra note 270, at 20. 
 275 Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 273, at 49. 
 276 KAHNEMAN, supra note 270, at 21. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 86. 
 279 Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking]; see also Chris 
Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch 
Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1480–82 (2009) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Hidden].  
 280 Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 279, at 9.  
 281 Id. at 10–19 (describing results of the Cognitive Reflection Test with judges); see 
also KAHNEMAN, supra note 270, at 48 (explaining test). 
 282 Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 279, at 19–27 (discussing examples of 
anchoring, representativeness, and hindsight bias); see also Guthrie et al., Hidden, supra 
note 279, at 1495–520 (discussing research with administrative law judges on anchoring, 
framing, conjunction, hindsight bias, disregarding, and egocentric bias); Chris Guthrie et 
al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787–815 (2001) [hereinafter 
Guthrie et al., Inside] (discussing research with federal magistrate judges on anchoring, 
framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases); Andrew J. 
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of 
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Some of these heuristics, or “cognitive illusions,”283 are especially 
problematic when a judge has conducted a settlement conference. The most 
obvious source of potential bias is anchoring, a commonplace cognitive 
phenomenon that affects people when they make quantitative judgments. 
Individuals are influenced by the first number available to them, which creates 
an “anchor” that pulls their estimate up or down.284 Even if this anchor is 
something completely ridiculous, it can alter one’s judgment.285  
Experiments indicate that judges are susceptible to anchors based on 
settlement demands when making damage awards. Judges were asked to 
determine damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury suit following 
an unsuccessful settlement conference with the judge.286 Those in one 
experiment were told that the plaintiff had demanded $175,000 in the 
settlement talks (low anchor), while judges in a second experiment were told 
the plaintiff asked for $10 million (high anchor).287 In both experiments, a 
control group of judges was not given any demand figure.288 The applicable 
evidentiary rules required the judges to ignore the amount of the settlement 
demands, and they were reminded of this in the scenario.289 Yet the awards by 
judges who had numerical information about the settlement demand were 
significantly higher, or lower, than those in the control group, depending on 
the anchor.290 The pull of the anchors was so strong that the judges were 
                                                                                                                     
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (describing assessments of 
judges’ ability to disregard inadmissible evidence). 
 283 Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 279, at 40.  
 284 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128–30 (1974) (describing anchoring and showing how 
providing different starting points influences estimates); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 
270, at 119–28 (discussing mechanisms of anchoring and its effects); ROBBENNOLT & 
STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 71–72 (discussing anchoring in the legal context). 
 285 For example, when people were asked to estimate the average daytime temperature 
in San Francisco, they gave higher values if they had first been asked if the average 
temperature was greater than 558 degrees Fahrenheit. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 146 (1993).  
 286 Wistrich et al., supra note 282, at 1288–89.  
 287 Id. 
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. at 1289. 
 290 The judges in the low anchor group awarded an average of $612,000 in damages, 
less than half the average of the control group. Id. at 1289. In the high anchor group, the 
average damage award was $2.2 million, approaching three times that of the control group. 
Id. at 1290.  
In another experiment demonstrating anchoring, a personal injury scenario with 
substantial damages, judges awarded significantly less if they were told that the defendants 
had filed a motion to dismiss the case from federal court on the ground that it did not meet 
the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 
279, at 21; Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 282, at 790–91. While the motion clearly 
lacked merit under the facts of the scenario, judges exposed to this anchoring figure 
awarded nearly 30% less on average than judges who were not told about the motion. 
Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 279, at 21; Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 282, at 
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influenced despite the fact that they knew the settlement demands were 
irrelevant.291  
An actual settlement situation will often provide judges with even more 
anchoring information than the experiments: judges are likely to learn not only 
demands, but also the parties’ bottom lines. Settlement judges are also 
routinely exposed to other information that can influence their views.292 And, 
while judges tend to be confident about their ability to compartmentalize and 
ignore inadmissible information,293 intentionally disregarding or forgetting is a 
difficult mental task. Judges are likely to find it hard to ignore knowledge such 
as a party’s statements of personal interests, goals, and priorities, or the 
judge’s impression of a party’s degree of cooperation in the settlement 
process. These factors would not normally be relevant to the judge’s legal 
determinations, but such information is likely to have a persistent effect on her 
judgment. Experiments with judges given a variety of inadmissible 
                                                                                                                     
791–92; see also Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence 
of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 196–97 (2006) (reporting effects on length of sentences from 
sentencing demands that judges knew to be randomly generated); Guthrie et al., Hidden, 
supra note 279, at 1501–06 (reporting anchoring by administrative law judges based on an 
irrelevant damage award from a court TV show). 
 291 Similar studies have demonstrated analogous anchoring bias with mock jurors; their 
damage awards are influenced by the amount they are told the plaintiff has requested in the 
lawsuit. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the 
More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
519, 525–27 (1996). In the case of juries, the legal system has reacted to this effect of 
anchoring. Some states have enacted provisions to eliminate this source of bias, either by 
prohibiting tort plaintiffs from specifying the amount of damages they seek in the 
complaint, see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.3 (West 2008) (prohibiting “ad 
damnum” clause); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 52 (2003) (prohibiting dollar amount in 
demand in any civil case), or by prohibiting disclosure to the jury, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE 
§ 10-111 (2010) (grounds for mistrial to reveal amount of general damages sued for); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-117 (2012) (demands for a specific sum may not be disclosed to 
the jury in a health care liability action). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216b (West 
2013) (authorizing counsel in personal injury or wrongful death cases to articulate the 
amount of damages claimed to the jury). Moreover, the practice of using closing argument 
to suggest a specific award that would compensate for noneconomic damages, such as pain 
and suffering, has fallen into disfavor in some courts on the ground that it risks 
“anchor[ing] the jurors’ expectations of a fair award at a place set by counsel, rather than 
by the evidence.” Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1016 (2d Cir. 
1995), vacated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1031 (1996). See generally Don Rushing et al., 
Anchors Away: Attacking Dollar Suggestions for Non-Economic Damages in Closings, 70 
DEF. COUNSEL J. 378 (2003) (citing cases). 
 292 See supra text accompanying notes 241–46. 
 293 See supra text accompanying notes 235–38. This confidence may result from a 
tendency toward positive illusions and egocentric bias. See infra text accompanying notes 
314–16. 
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information indicate that, in many cases, they were unable to ignore it in 
making legal decisions.294  
One explanation for why the task of disregarding information is so 
challenging is that information produces what psychologists call “mental 
contamination,” which persists even if a person recognizes that the 
information is misleading or inaccurate.295 The brain stores information in a 
holistic manner using cognitive organizing principles called schemas that then 
influence how additional stimuli are processed.296 Thus, the influence of the 
initial information (for example, something a judge learns during settlement 
that he knows should be ignored) persists through the schema and affects the 
ways that later information is interpreted. Disregarding information is also 
difficult because of the phenomenon of “belief perseverance.” New 
information is incorporated into a person’s existing knowledge quickly and 
ideas formed unconsciously can persist, making it hard to eradicate beliefs 
based on that information.297 Due to these characteristics of memory, 
“[m]erely ignoring the information itself is not enough.”298 Even if a judge can 
ignore a specific fact she learned during a settlement conference and prevent it 
from directly affecting her judgment, the attitudes and inferences that she 
associates with that information can still influence her decision indirectly.299  
In addition to the mental challenges that a judge faces in trying to truly 
ignore irrelevant information, a prior role as a settlement neutral may also 
influence later decisionmaking because of a process known as “confirmation 
bias.”300 When seeking new information, people tend to look for information 
that confirms existing views and disregard information that challenges those 
views.301 Moreover, that new information tends to be assessed in ways that are 
                                                                                                                     
 294 Wistrich et al., supra note 282, at 1286–322 (reporting that judges’ rulings showed 
they were unable to disregard what they knew about settlement demands, information 
protected by the attorney-client privilege, sexual history in a sexual assault case, a criminal 
record in a civil case, and information excluded by a sentencing agreement, but were able 
to ignore the outcome of a search without probable cause and a criminal confession 
obtained after a request for counsel); see also Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and 
Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125 (1994) (finding that judges were 
unable to disregard evidence that a tort defendant had taken subsequent remedial 
measures). 
 295 Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 272, at 185, 185–87.  
 296 See Wistrich et al., supra note 282, at 1265–67 (providing examples); see also 
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 12–13. 
 297 Wistrich et al., supra note 282, at 1267–69.  
 298 Id. at 1269.  
 299 Id. at 1270.  
 300 ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 15. 
 301 Id. at 14–16; Eva Jonas et al., Giving Advice or Making Decisions in Someone 
Else’s Place: The Influence of Impression, Defense, and Accuracy Motivation on the 
Search for New Information, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 977, 978 (2005) 
(noting bias “in favor of previously held beliefs, expectations, or desired conclusions”).  
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consistent with preexisting attitudes or expectations, which is known as 
“biased assimilation.”302 These effects are particularly strong in 
decisionmaking settings. In order to reduce cognitive dissonance, a person 
who previously made a choice tends to prefer information that supports that 
choice and to deprecate information that opposes it.303  
One of the most effective methods for avoiding bias in a decisionmaking 
process is to deliberately consider opposing viewpoints and arguments.304 This 
is consistent with the theory of the adversary process in which the 
decisionmaker hears arguments presented by both sides of a case. There are, 
however, two ways in which the adversary process might not work ideally as a 
debiasing mechanism following a settlement conference.  
First, it is not uncommon for a settlement neutral to assess a case or 
suggest that parties settle for a particular amount, particularly in a traditionally 
evaluative settlement conference.305 Even though a judge may not actually 
commit to any particular decision based on a preliminary assessment, 
cognitively this can be enough to trigger bias in subsequent interpretations of 
evidence. Research suggests that the tendency to seek confirming information 
operates not only to reinforce firm decisions, but is also triggered by 
preliminary decisions306 and even by what cognitive scientists call 
“predecision” thinking.307 Thus, an opinion a judge voices in settlement can 
influence the judge’s interpretation of additional, more complete information 
added later at trial through an unconscious tendency to support the preliminary 
assessment.  
Second, judges are privy to private information in settlement when they 
meet with parties in caucus. This ex parte information is not subject to rebuttal 
by the other side because it is unknown.308 Thus, while evidence presented at 
trial may be sufficient to counter earlier impressions gained through traditional 
pretrial management, it cannot fully address impressions that stem from 
information conveyed to the judge in confidence during settlement.  
There are factors associated with judging that may reduce the effects of 
System 1 thinking on judges’ decisions. There have been suggestions that 
decisionmakers who are highly motivated to make accurate decisions may use 
                                                                                                                     
 302 ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 15. 
 303 J. Edward Russo et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102, 102 (1996).  
 304 ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 16, 77–83 (discussing 
“debiasing”). 
 305 See supra notes 151, 163–69 and accompanying text.  
 306 Eva Jonas et al., Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search After 
Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective 
Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557, 557–58 (2001).  
 307 Aaron L. Brownstein, Biased Predecision Processing, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 545, 
545 (2003). In developing a preference, decisionmakers seem to distort new information so 
as to favor their leading alternative, Russo et al., supra note 303, at 107, and thus inhibit 
careful and objective consideration of all alternatives. 
 308 It may also be irrelevant as an evidentiary matter. 
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more accurate reasoning.309 As professional decisionmakers, judges would 
ideally display this motivation. The transparency of the judicial process may 
also help. Experimental evidence suggests that anchoring has less influence if 
people are told that they must explain their estimates,310 so when a decision 
involves writing a judicial opinion, that may constrain anchoring bias.  
More generally, accountability can be seen as an incentive that increases 
willingness to put more effort into the decisionmaking process by using 
System 2 thinking.311 Since judges are accustomed to public scrutiny of their 
decisions, at the very least by parties and their attorneys, this may reduce the 
bias introduced by participating in settlement. There is, however, growing 
evidence that all forms of accountability are not equal. People who know they 
will have to justify the process behind their judgment display more accurate 
and unbiased decisionmaking than those who are merely held accountable for 
the outcome of the process.312 Judges’ opinions typically justify the outcome 
of their decisions, not the decisionmaking process. And unfortunately, other 
key factors that encourage deliberative thinking, such as prompt and accurate 
feedback, are missing from the judicial decisionmaking environment.313 
In evaluating the cognitive effects of participating in settlement, it is 
particularly important to be skeptical of judges’ own assessments of their 
abilities. This is because positive cognitive illusions make it difficult for 
judges to evaluate their own decisionmaking objectively. “Overconfidence” 
means we don’t allow sufficiently for uncertainty in the judgments we 
make.314 This tendency is increased with access to evidence for only one side 
of a story.315 “Egocentric bias” means we overestimate our abilities and make 
judgments consistent with our own point of view.316 Judges are no different.317 
Yet despite the cognitive evidence to the contrary, some judges are very 
confident that they can ignore what happened during settlement in subsequent 
proceedings.318 This is likely to be overconfidence, which can exacerbate the 
                                                                                                                     
 309 Brownstein, supra note 307, at 565.  
 310 Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 262–63 (1999).  
 311 See Jonas et al., supra note 301, at 988. 
 312 Id. 
 313 See Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 279, at 32 (discussing the lack of feedback 
in litigation and explaining why appellate review is an inadequate mechanism).  
 314 ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 68. 
 315 KAHNEMAN, supra note 270, at 86–88 (reporting that confidence in judgments is 
increased by coherence of the story). 
 316 ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 244, at 70. 
 317 Guthrie et al., Inside, supra note 282, at 813–16; see also Theodore Eisenberg, 
Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 983–
87 (1994) (reporting a study of bankruptcy judges who overestimated the degree to which 
lawyers who appeared before them felt they were fair, efficient, and diligent).  
 318 LACEY, supra note 44, at 23 (“As you become known as one who can conduct 
[settlement] discussions without coloring your judgment at trial, lawyers will not hesitate 
to engage in full, frank discussion with you.”); Martin, supra note 159, at 194–95 
2017] BEYOND “MANAGERIAL JUDGES” 127 
problem by preventing a judge from recognizing the effects of settlement 
conferences on her decisionmaking. This lack of recognition is, in turn, likely 
to reduce the vigilance that might help judges deploy System 2 deliberative 
thinking to avoid the distortions settlement conferences can introduce. Even 
under the best of conditions, fighting these tendencies is difficult, for judges 
just as for the rest of us, because they operate at an unconscious level.  
These cognitive insights are in tension with current standards for judicial 
conduct and settlement practices, which are examined in the following Part. 
The after-the-fact remedies for bias also provide an illustration of how legal 
standards fail to reflect modern conceptualizations of bias and its sources. The 
recusal and disqualification statute,319 for instance, applies when a judge has 
an opinion, either favorable or unfavorable, “that is somehow wrongful or 
inappropriate, either because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not 
possess, or because it is excessive in degree.”320 Knowledge that a subject 
“ought not possess” is limited to extrajudicial sources of information; this 
limitation reflects a traditional conception of judicial activity that does not 
contemplate judges’ modern roles in conducting settlement. The alternative 
prerequisite, that a judge’s opinion must be “excessive” in order to be 
inappropriate, means that the judge must express a strong identifiable animus 
or favoritism. This focus on only expressed, pronounced bias reflects an 
outdated, confident view of rational decisionmaking that does not recognize 
psychological insights into actual behavior. Information shared in settlement 
may skew or distort a judge’s subsequent attitudes, and perhaps decisions 
about a case, even without producing any visible animus or strong favoritism. 
This modern understanding of the subtle operation of bias supports the view 
that knowledge gained in settlement raises questions about impartiality. 
Because judges can avoid this knowledge, it should be regarded as 
“inappropriate” even if it is not “extrajudicial.”  
IV. LIMITING (APPROPRIATELY) THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN SETTLEMENT 
The final Part of this Article evaluates possible mechanisms for avoiding 
the problems of dual neutral functions in the settlement context. Part IV.A 
reviews efforts to restrict judges assigned for trial from serving as a settlement 
                                                                                                                     
(describing a judge who conducts his own settlement conferences when he is the trier of 
fact because, as the judge, “he is able to ‘turn off’ the information he learned as a 
mediator”); Miller, supra note 128, at 33 (“When I was in private practice, one of my 
sensitivities about a judge getting actively involved in the settlement process was a concern 
for whether he or she could put aside what was said in mediation when it came time to 
decide the case. . . . In my own mind, I’m confident that I can do that . . . .” (quoting Judge 
McCarthy)).  
 319 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1) (2012); see also supra text accompanying notes 216–18, 
252–56. 
 320 Blackmon v. Eaton Corp., 587 F. App’x 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 814 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
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neutral as an ethical matter. I conclude, given the failure to incorporate any 
restrictions on settlement activity into recent revisions of ethical standards, 
that this is not a promising avenue. Part IV.B considers proposals to better 
define acceptable judicial behaviors in settlement. I argue that this approach is 
an incomplete solution that could have deleterious side effects and is likely 
unworkable. Part IV.C explores the most promising path for reform: separating 
the roles of settlement and adjudicative neutrals by limiting the authorization 
for settlement activity in Rule 16 and other procedural rules. This structural 
solution would be a preventative measure, and hence more effective than after-
the-fact evaluations for disqualification based on the circumstances of 
particular settlements (which are problematic for the reasons described above). 
There is precedent for this approach in some local district court ADR rules and 
state confidentiality provisions that apply principles of separation to reduce the 
risks of both coercion and partiality. This Article closes by urging rulemakers 
to draw on these local and state rules and to extend their principles to the 
regulation of settlement conferences.  
A. Limiting the Judicial Role in Settlement as an Ethical Principle  
In the most recent attempts at reform, the focus on limiting the settlement 
role of judicial neutrals in assigned cases centered on ethical obligations. For 
federal judges, judicial ethics are governed by the Code of Conduct for United 
States Judges.321 State court judges are subject to the code adopted in their 
state,322 some of which make no mention of settlement.323 Historically, both 
federal and state codes have been influenced by the ABA Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct and its predecessors.324  
An opportunity to strengthen the provisions on settlement in the ABA 
Model Code arose when the ABA undertook a revision beginning in 2003.325 
In 2005, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution presented a proposal to revise 
                                                                                                                     
 321 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES 
JUDGES, in 2A GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, ch. 2, intro. [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN6Q-
VECJ] (last revised Mar. 30, 2014). 
 322 See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 3(B)(7) (SUPREME COURT OF CAL. 
2015); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6 (SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 2017); TEX. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(8)(b) (SUPREME COURT OF TEX. 2002). 
 323 See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE r. 100.3 (N.Y. STATE UNIFIED 
COURT SYS. 2015) (dealing with adjudicatory responsibilities only); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3.1 (JUDICIAL CONDUCT BD. OF PA. 2014). 
 324 Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model 
Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 280 (2007). 
 325 See JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, OVERVIEW OF MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AS ADOPTED FEBRUARY 12, 
2007, at 1 [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF MODEL CODE], http://www.americanbar.org/content/d 
am/aba/migrated/2011_build/professional_responsibility/overview_gak_030707.authcheck
dam.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF9R-9P5S]. 
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the provisions on judicial ethics on settlement.326 It provided that a judge 
should not act as a mediator if he or she would also be judging the merits of 
the case.327 In addition, the merits judge would receive very limited 
information about the mediation: only whether a mediation was held, who 
attended, and whether a settlement was reached.328 This proposal was rejected.  
The revision process culminated in the adoption of the 2007 ABA Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, which does not even address whether a judge who 
participates in settlement efforts should be permitted to hear the case if those 
efforts are unsuccessful.329 Instead, Rule 2.6, Ensuring the Right to be Heard, 
merely states: 
 A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle 
matters in dispute but shall not act in a manner that coerces any party into 
settlement.330  
Elsewhere, the Model Code prohibits, as a general matter, ex parte 
communications concerning pending matters.331 But there is an explicit 
exception for judges, “with the consent of the parties,” to “confer separately 
with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before 
the judge.”332  
The current official Code of Conduct for United States Judges, adopted by 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, has an almost identical provision. 
Canon 3 prohibits ex parte communications on the merits in pending matters 
but has a similar exception, which provides that a judge may “with the consent 
of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their counsel in an effort 
                                                                                                                     
 326 SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, PROPOSED ADDITION TO THE 
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Feb. 2005), http://www.americanbar.org/conten 
t/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/resources/comm_rules_aba_dispute_resolution_020405_
ddt.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LHL-8G9X]. 
 327 Id.  
 328 Id.; see also Molly McDonough, Meddling in Settling: Pressure to Clear Caseloads 
Spurs Judges to Coerce Settlements, Critics Say, ABA J., June 2005, at 14, 14 (describing 
proposal and citing perception that “plenty of judges coerce settlements or otherwise 
improperly meddle with the mediation process”). This and similar proposals were 
supported by numerous commentators. See, e.g., Alfini, supra note 119, at 14; Cratsley, 
supra note 122, at 585–94; Floyd, supra note 10, at 88–89; Sylvia Shaz Shweder, Judicial 
Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging Settlements, 20 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 51, 69–70 (2007). 
 329 OVERVIEW OF MODEL CODE, supra note 325, at 4. 
 330 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6(B) (AM BAR ASS’N 2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/ABA_MCJC_approv
ed.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/68T7-XLYP]. This provision did, however, elevate 
the caution against coercion from a comment in the prior Model Code into the canon itself, 
thus emphasizing this important principle. 
 331 Id. r. 2.9(A). 
 332 Id. r. 2.9(A)(4). 
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to mediate or settle pending matters.”333 The commentary states that “[a] judge 
may encourage and seek to facilitate settlement but should not act in a manner 
that coerces any party into surrendering the right to have the controversy 
resolved by the courts.”334 
It is interesting that both of these provisions stress preventing coercion in 
settlement, rather than the usual worry stemming from ex parte 
communication: unrebuttable information that can skew decisionmaking. To 
the extent these settlement exceptions ignore the informational consequences 
of ex parte communication in settlement, they stand in tension with the general 
principles of due process in adjudication.  
In 2009, the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct 
interpreted the official Code of Conduct’s settlement provision in an advisory 
opinion: Judges Acting in a Settlement Capacity.335 The Committee 
determined that a trial judge’s participation in settlement efforts in a case 
assigned to her for trial is not “inherently improper under the Code.”336 It 
relied heavily on the Rules of Civil Procedure and local rules in reaching this 
conclusion. The opinion stressed the fact that “Rule 16 does not prevent a 
judge who engaged in settlement discussions from presiding over a trial,”337 
and concluded that, while a judge’s actions could raise concerns in a particular 
case, there is no per se impropriety in an assigned judge leading settlement 
discussions or conducting a trial afterwards.338 Local procedural rules that 
explicitly permit the practice “lend[] support to the propriety of a judge’s 
actions in this respect.”339  
One way to read the canon and its interpretation is that it extends the 
discretion granted in Rule 16 from procedural rules to ethical rules. The 
Committee concluded that, in the absence of a local rule prohibiting a dual 
neutral role, ethical concerns should be evaluated by considering settlement 
practices on a case-by-case basis.340 The Committee felt that such concerns are 
less serious when a judge who has led settlement negotiations presides over a 
jury trial, or when the parties have consented to the dual role.341 They also 
identified the type of information learned in settlement as an important 
variable, observing that, “The extent to which a judge’s impartiality may be 
compromised, . . . will depend in part on the nature and degree of the judge’s 
participation in settlement . . . .”342  
                                                                                                                     
 333 CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 321, Canon 3(A)(4)(d).  
 334 Id. Canon 3(A)(4) cmt. 
 335 See generally Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 237. 
 336 Id. at 162. 
 337 Id. at 161. 
 338 Id. at 162. 
 339 Id. 
 340 Id. at 163.  
 341 Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 237, at 162. 
 342 Id. at 163. 
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There are those who express discomfort with the discretion that implicitly 
accompanies this flexibility. They believe the canon is so elastic that it does 
not provide adequate guidance, instead allowing judges to conclude that a vast 
number of very different approaches to settlement are ethical.343 Certainly the 
check on discretion prescribed in the judicial ethics opinion—a case-by-case, 
after-the-fact evaluation of the circumstances to determine their effect on a 
judge’s impartiality—is not as prophylactic as a bright-line rule. Moreover, 
such evaluations require uncovering communications in mediation in ways 
that could either be blocked by confidentiality principles, or violate them. But 
perhaps the strongest argument against relying on ethical rules to limit dual 
judicial roles is a practical one: the proposal based on defining the problem as 
a matter of ethics was not approved. This was, at least in part, due to 
opposition from judges. They believe settlement is an important function of 
their job and oppose limiting their discretion to achieve it.344  
B. Limiting the Judicial Role in Settlement by Defining Acceptable 
Judicial Involvement  
For some, the concern with judicial activity in settlement is seen as a need 
to constrain problematic judicial behavior in settlement. This is primarily a 
concern about coercion. Under the discretionary framework that governs 
settlement conferences, statutes and court rules provide little guidance on 
acceptable judicial behavior in settlement.345 One suggestion, raised by a 
number of commentators, is to adopt new ethical or procedural rules to clarify 
the appropriate limits of judicial settlement behavior.346 Judge Cratsley, for 
example, notes the significant variability in judicial approaches to settlement 
and maintains that clearer rules will “promote litigants’ confidence in the 
trustworthiness and fairness” of the judiciary.347 These rules would 
presumably apply to all settlement judges, whether assigned an adjudicatory 
role or not. While some guidance is appropriate through education, and more 
work could be done to establish appropriate norms, in my view it would be 
unduly restrictive (and likely unworkable) to incorporate behavioral limits on 
judicial settlement into procedural or ethical rules.  
First, there is a wide range of acceptable behaviors and roles for neutrals in 
settlement and little agreement on particular limits. With regard to mediation, 
                                                                                                                     
 343 See Cratsley, supra note 117, at 4. 
 344 See Judicial Code Panel Gets Close to Releasing Full Draft, Hears More Feedback 
on Its Work, 21 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT 317 (2005) (describing 
negative reactions of judges on the ABA Commission at a public hearing). 
 345 See Agnes, supra note 82, at 265; Alfini, supra note 119, at 12. 
 346 See, e.g, Cratsley, supra note 117, at 4; Floyd, supra note 10, at 87–88; Shoot & 
McGrath, supra note 197, at 34; Tornquist, supra note 50, at 773; William L. Adams, 
Comment, Let’s Make a Deal: Effective Utilization of Judicial Settlements in State and 
Federal Courts, 72 OR. L. REV. 427, 455–56 (1993). 
 347 Cratsley, supra note 117, at 4. 
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for example, there has been vigorous debate over the appropriateness of using 
evaluative techniques.348 There are regional variations in practices such as 
using joint sessions, and variations based on the type of case, such as whether 
it is a commercial or family dispute. Thus it would be very difficult to agree on 
generally applicable, comprehensive guidelines with any meaningful 
specificity.  
Second, there is a real danger that an effort to codify particular behaviors 
as acceptable for settlement neutrals would impair one of the great strengths of 
mediation: its flexibility. Good mediators (and good settlement judges) need to 
be able to tailor their approach to a particular case and to respond to the unique 
circumstances of the parties.349 This means that discretion regarding approach 
and technique is useful, and excessive regulatory intrusion that introduces 
rigidity should be avoided.  
Third, the proposals aimed at defining acceptable judicial behaviors in 
settlement address only half of the problem. They primarily react to worries 
about coercion in the settlement process by forceful judges. The solution (a 
more detailed settlement code of conduct) would not be particularly effective 
in reducing the risk of partiality stemming from dual roles in settlement and 
adjudication. To limit the potential for bias by regulating judicial conduct, a 
behavioral measure would need to restrict the information available to an 
assigned judge during settlement. But this would also impair his effectiveness 
as a settlement neutral.350 One federal district court does have a local 
settlement rule of this nature. It addresses concerns about partiality by 
precluding judges presiding over settlement from obtaining the type of 
information that poses the most obvious risk: the parties’ settlement offers and 
demands.351 However, this restriction is remarkable for its rarity, probably 
because most districts recognize that it would reduce judges’ effectiveness in 
the settlement context. In contrast, in districts that have adopted a structural 
solution—substituting a settlement judge for the assigned judge—the rules can 
                                                                                                                     
 348 See supra note 143. 
 349 See, e.g., Golann, supra note 143, at 42; Stempel, supra note 143, at 970–83. 
 350 Despite the potential to diminish their effectiveness, there are nonetheless judges 
who self-censor their participation in settlement when assigned to trial due to worry about 
introducing bias. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 128, at 34 (quoting Judge Polster 
commenting that he limited communications when settling a case scheduled for a bench 
trial by discussing only business solutions, not the merits); Will et al., supra note 53, at 215 
(describing a judge who avoids discussion of settlement numbers even with a jury trial due 
to concern for bias in deciding potential post-verdict motions); see also CRAVER, supra 
note 259, § 16.14(2)(a) (suggesting a prohibition on parties stating specific demands as a 
way to prevent the anchoring effect in settlement conferences conducted by a judge 
assigned to trial); Deason, supra note 259, at 246–47 (describing a proposal for a no-
caucus approach to mediation in order to limit information flow when mediation is 
combined with international arbitration before the same neutral). 
 351 See, e.g., N.D. TEX. CIV. R. 16.3(b) (judge may not discuss settlement figures in 
nonjury cases “unless requested to do so by all concerned parties”). 
2017] BEYOND “MANAGERIAL JUDGES” 133 
endorse full access to information and encourage active participation by the 
settlement neutral.352  
Finally, it is unlikely that regulating specific judicial behaviors would be 
effective without reforms to enforcement standards and procedures. As 
Professor Floyd demonstrated, limitations in the standards for recusal based on 
actions during settlement and procedural barriers to appeals make enforcement 
of behavioral guidelines illusory.353 Happily, there is a more effective 
alternative to trying to manage and monitor individual judicial behavior: 
procedural rules that prevent conflicting neutral roles through structural and 
informational separation between adjudication and case management on the 
one hand, and settlement on the other. 
C. Principles from State and Local Federal Rules: Separating 
Managing from Settling  
Perhaps the most appropriate (and promising) way to address the problem 
is to avoid characterizing it as an issue of a particular judge’s ethics or 
behavior. The incompatible dual neutral roles assigned to judges are at their 
core a structural issue; it is a side effect of lumping all judicial functions 
related to settlement into the category of pretrial management. How should the 
role of adjudicating (with its associated managing) be separated from settling? 
We can look to the local district court rules and some state provisions for 
examples to follow.  
This Part examines three types of rules for principles that could be applied 
more generally in Rule 16. Alternatively, if uniformity in the federal courts 
proves impossible, individual federal courts and states could adopt these 
principles to harmonize their rules for settlement conferences and ADR 
programs. First, this Part considers rules that govern court ADR programs.354 
The provisions in local rules that govern who can serve as neutrals in ADR 
                                                                                                                     
 352 See, e.g., D. IDAHO CIV. R. 16.4(b)(1)(A) (judge’s function in settlement conference 
is to “facilitate communication between the parties and assist them in their negotiations, 
e.g., by clarifying underlying interests”); E.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(a) (discussion to include 
“every aspect of the case bearing on its settlement value”); id. R. 16.2(g) (participants are 
“required to be completely candid with the settlement judge so that the judge may properly 
guide settlement discussions”); N.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(a), (g) (containing the same 
language as the Eastern District of Oklahoma); M.D. TENN. R. 16.04(d)(1)(a) (parties 
provide settlement judge with ex parte settlement conference statement including 
settlement positions); D. UTAH CIV. R. 16-3(c) (settlement judge may discuss any aspect of 
the case and make suggestions or recommendations for settlement); see also Kearny v. 
Milwaukee County, No. 05-C-834, 2007 WL 3171395, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007) 
(order of recusal) (describing benefits to settlement of a judge’s “unencumbered” 
participation, in contrast to the ethical obligations that constrain a presiding judge). 
 353 Floyd, supra note 10, at 82–84; see also supra text accompanying notes 216–21. 
 354 As described above, see supra text accompanying notes 94–97, most courts 
currently segregate “ADR” from settlement conferences and provide separate 
authorizations in their rules. 
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programs often establish a clear separation between management and neutral 
functions. Second, this Part explores ADR confidentiality rules. They often go 
to the heart of the problem of access to information that is inherent in dual 
roles. Many impose restrictions on the flow of information from the settlement 
process to the assigned judge, which emphasizes a separation between the role 
of settlement neutral and the role of decisionmaking neutral. Third, this Part 
analyzes the problematic rules governing judicial settlement conferences. 
Here, some federal districts do separate management and neutral roles to avoid 
role conflicts, but this approach is by no means ubiquitous. This is where 
courts could improve their procedures by harmonizing their rules for 
settlement conferences with their ADR and confidentiality rules to limit 
judges’ discretion in settlement conferences.  
1. Rules on Neutral Roles in “ADR” Processes: Programmatic 
Separation 
In federal courts, the local rules that govern court-sponsored ADR 
programs tend to be both more detailed and more sensitive to conflicting 
neutral roles than the corresponding rules that govern settlement conferences 
convened by judges. ADR rules tend to allot settlement management tasks to 
the assigned judge,355 but structure programs in ways that limit judges’ 
discretion to serve as both the assigned judge and the ADR neutral. There are 
two typical patterns in local ADR rules. Under one common approach, judicial 
officers do not participate as mediators for the program.356 Instead, the parties 
usually agree on a private mediator. This person is often chosen from a court-
approved list, although some districts provide a staff mediator.357 Under a 
second approach, judicial officers do serve as mediators in the court-sponsored 
mediation program, which preserves the benefits of having a judicial officer as 
a mediator. Often magistrate judges shoulder a major responsibility for 
mediating cases in these programs.358 Neutral roles are typically kept separate 
                                                                                                                     
 355 See supra text accompanying notes 100–06. 
 356 Under this approach, judges similarly do not serve as neutrals for neutral evaluation 
or court-annexed arbitration if the court sponsors those processes. Summary jury trials or 
summary bench trials are an exception, often presided over by the same judge who will 
hear the case if there is no settlement. They are not considered in this Article because they 
are relatively rare and because the neutral’s role in those processes has so much overlap 
with the judge’s role at trial. 
 357 Unfortunately, staff mediators in some districts, such as the Southern District of 
Ohio, have been eliminated due to budget cuts. E-mail from Terence P. Kemp, Mag., U.S. 
Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Ohio, to author (Mar. 11, 2017, 10:44 EST) (on file with 
author). 
 358 See, e.g., Kearny v. Milwaukee County, No. 05-C-834, 2007 WL 3171395, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007) (order of recusal) (stating that the court refers cases to magistrate 
judges for mediation under its ADR policy (citing E.D. WIS. CIV. R. 72.2(b)(20))); Garrett 
v. Delta Queen Steamboat Co., Inc., No. 05-1492-CJB-SS, 2007 WL 837177, at *2 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 14, 2007) (stating that magistrate judge schedules about eight settlement 
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by a rule specifying that the judicial officer who is assigned to try the case 
may not serve as the mediator.359 Both of these design structures for ADR 
programs effectively divide an assigned judge’s extensive pretrial management 
functions from any role as a settlement neutral, and thus prevent conflicts 
between adjudicatory and settlement roles.  
2. Rules on ADR Confidentiality: Isolating the Assigned Judge from 
Settlement Information 
In addition to imposing a structural separation between the neutral 
responsible for adjudication and management and the settlement neutral in 
court ADR programs, many federal courts have confidentiality rules for these 
programs. These provisions are aimed at the potential for settlement to serve 
as a source of bias even with separate neutrals. They prevent settlement 
information from flowing to the adjudicator by explicitly prohibiting 
mediators from disclosing details about a mediation to the assigned judge.360 
They demonstrate a sensitivity to the distortions that can be introduced into 
decisions if a judge learns what happened or what was said in a settlement 
process, and reflect an understanding that such reports from mediators will 
undermine confidence in the integrity of the settlement process. Courts also 
limit information flow to assigned judges by preventing them from seeing the 
pre-mediation or evaluation statements that parties prepare for the settlement 
neutral,361 or by strictly limiting the information that may be reported to them 
at the close of the process.362  
Some states impose similar restrictions on communications to the court 
about the settlement process either by court rule or by state statute. For 
example, in Minnesota, communications to the court are strictly limited during 
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 359 See, e.g., D. ALASKA CIV. R. 16.2(e)(2)(A) (court may order parties to mediate 
before a district, bankruptcy, or magistrate judge who is not assigned to the case); S.D. W. 
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 360 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 5-12(a)(2), 6-12(a)(2); N.D. GA. CIV. R. 16.7(F)(3); 
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exception that allows communication to the assigned judge with the consent of all the 
parties. See, e.g., C.D. ILL. R. 16.4(E)(7); M.D. TENN. R. 16.05(e). 
 361 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 5-8(b). 
 362 Reporting restrictions often limit the content of a mediator’s report. See, e.g., D. 
ALASKA CIV. R. 16.2(e)(3)(A); W.D. MICH. CIV. R. 16.3(f); N.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.6(h); 
E.D. TENN. R. 16.4(m); M.D. TENN. R. 16.05(e). A parallel principle is often used with 
nonbinding arbitration so that the assigned judge may not learn the award until after a final 
judgment is entered or the case is terminated. See, e.g., N.D. OHIO CIV. R. 16.7. 
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and following an ADR process.363 If the parties do not come to an agreement, 
the neutral may report only that fact, without comment or recommendation.364 
The Uniform Mediation Act, now enacted in twelve jurisdictions, prohibits 
mediators from making reports to judges who may rule on the dispute in order 
to maintain “confidence in the neutrality of the mediator and in the mediation 
process.”365 
3. Rules on Judicial Settlement Conferences: Mostly Silence and 
Ambiguity 
In contrast to the detailed rules and extensive protections in the context of 
ADR programs and confidentiality rules, federal local rules tend to be 
relatively silent concerning judicially-sponsored settlement conferences. Many 
rules refer only to pretrial conferences in general; they do not differentiate 
settlement conferences from other types of pretrial conferences. When the 
local rules do mention settlement conferences explicitly, their approach to 
assigning neutral roles spans the full spectrum. Some protect against threats to 
impartiality by limiting the judicial discretion of the assigned judge to serve as 
the neutral and by providing confidentiality protections. Many, however, are 
silent or ambiguous about the identity of neutrals. Yet others explicitly endorse 
a dual-neutral role for judges in settlement and adjudication.  
A substantial number of districts have adopted the principle of structural 
separation urged in this Article through rules that explicitly exclude the 
assigned judge from serving as the presiding neutral at a settlement 
conference.366 A number of these districts also extend robust confidentiality 
principles to their settlement conferences.367 Others less comprehensively 
specify particular mechanisms to insulate assigned judges from learning about 
                                                                                                                     
 363 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.10(c), (d).  
 364 Id. R. 114.10(d). The neutral’s report may also, with the parties consent, identify 
pending motions, outstanding legal issues, or discovery processes that, if resolved or 
completed would further the possibility of a settlement. Id.; see also IND. ADR R. 
2.7(E)(1). 
 365 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 7(a) & cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). There are limited 
exceptions allowing mediators to disclose whether mediation occurred, whether settlement 
was reached, and attendance. Id. § 7(b)(1).  
 366 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 7-2; D. IDAHO CIV. R. 16.4(b)(2)(B); C.D. ILL. R. 
16.4(B); N.D. ILL. CIV. R. 16.1(5); N.D. & S.D. IOWA CIV. R. 16.2(e); D. MASS. R. 16.4(b) 
(allowing case referral from a pretrial conference “to another judicial officer for settlement 
purposes”); E.D.N.C. CIV. R. 101.2(c); W.D.N.C. CIV. R. 16.3(D); D.N.D. R. 16.2(C)(1); 
E.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(j); N.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(c); W.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(a); D. OR. 
R. 16-4; M.D. TENN. R. 16.04(a); D. UTAH CIV. R. 16-3(b); see also Dale, supra note 159, 
at 47 (describing the settlement role of magistrate judges in the District of Idaho). Some 
limit this exclusion to assigned judges who are scheduled to conduct a bench trial. See, e.g., 
D. CONN. CIV. R. 16(c)(2); C.D. ILL. R. 16.1(B). 
 367 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. ADR R. 7-4(a); D.N.D. R. 16.2(C); M.D. TENN. R. 16.04(d)(3). 
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the content of settlement conferences.368 There are also rules that channel 
disputes or reports about problems in dispute resolution processes away from 
the assigned judge,369 which helps prevent judicial bias by limiting 
information that might create a bad impression about participants.  
Other rules that mention settlement conferences are silent or ambiguous as 
to who will conduct the conference and whether the assigned judge is 
eligible.370 It may be that the practice in these districts is to assign the 
facilitation role to separate settlement judges, but the local rules do not impose 
any firm limitation on judicial discretion.371 Finally, there are districts that 
explicitly reject a principle of separation. They specify that the assigned judge 
will personally conduct settlement conferences or reserve this power for the 
assigned judge.372 The districts with rules that are silent on settlement 
conferences, along with those that are ambiguous or explicitly authorize 
blending neutral roles, all demonstrate the need for a uniform national rule that 
does not leave decisions about settlement neutrals to the discretion of local 
judges.  
D. A Proposal for Revised Procedural Rules  
Many judges have expressed the personal view that settlement 
negotiations should not take place before the judge who will later adjudicate 
the case, or they have proposed separating these functions.373 Numerous 
                                                                                                                     
 368 These measures include prohibiting communications about information discussed at 
a settlement conference, see, e.g., D. IDAHO CIV. R. 16.4(b)(2)(F), preventing parties from 
filing their settlement conference memos with the court, see, e.g., D. WYO. CIV. R. 
16.3(c)(2)(A), or limiting reports following the conference to whether or not the parties 
reached a settlement, see, e.g., D. IDAHO CIV. R. 16.4(b)(2)(E); E.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(j); 
N.D. OKLA. CIV. R. 16.2(j); D. UTAH CIV. R. 16-3(d). 
 369 Some districts appoint a single judge as a compliance judge who handles all 
allegations that the ADR rules were violated or a process abused. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 
271(m)(2)(C)(ii), (p); D.D.C. CIV. R. 84.9(a)(2), 84.10; D. UTAH CIV. R. 16-2(j)(1). 
 370 For an example of this ambiguity, see S.D. W. VA. CIV. R. 16.3, under which the 
judicial officer to whom the case is assigned convenes pretrial conferences, and id. R. 
16.7(c), which states that the final settlement conference is to be conducted by “the judicial 
officer.”  
 371 See, e.g., D. ME. R. 83.11(c); D. MD. CIV. R. 607(1); W.D. MICH. CIV. R. 16.8; D. 
MINN. R. 16.5(a)(4); N.D. & S.D. MISS. R. 16(g); W.D. VA. R. 83; W.D. WASH. CIV. R. 
39.1(a), (c); N.D. W. VA. CIV. R. 16.04(e); E.D. WIS. CIV. R. 16(d). 
 372 See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 16-15.4; S.D. CAL. CIV. R. 16.1(c), 16.3; D. CONN. CIV. R. 
16(c); D. HAW. R. 16.5; D. N. MAR. I. CIV. R. 16.2CJ(e)(5)(c); W.D. TENN. CIV. R. 16.1(b); 
see also C.D. ILL. R. 16.3(I)(4)(a) (special provision for prisoner cases); D.N.H. CIV. R. 
16.2(a)(8) (requiring parties to include information in their final pretrial statement 
describing their ADR participation and their final demand or offer, except in bench trials). 
 373 See, e.g., Jaclyn Barnao, In Pursuit of Settlement: Deciphering Judicial Activism, 
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 594–95 (2005) (quoting Judge Levy); Brazil Interview, 
supra note 153, at 24 (quoting Judge Bremer); Crane, supra note 122, at 21; Cratsley, 
supra note 122, at 571; R. Allan Edgar, A Judge’s View—ADR and the Federal Courts—
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commentators agree.374 As discussed above, lawyers strongly prefer settlement 
with a judge who is not assigned to try their case.375 Encouragingly, some state 
and local federal court rules do impose this separation.376 And, even when 
they do not, some judges recuse themselves voluntarily after presiding over a 
settlement conference or mediation out of a concern for public perception and 
the importance of trust in the court system.377 
Yet many judges do not see a problem.378 A vocal group is on the record 
defending the practice of settling their assigned cases.379 Empirical evidence 
about judges’ attitudes is slight, but in a recent study of California state court 
judges a strong majority felt that they should be allowed to conduct settlement 
conferences (82%) or mediate (71%) with the consent of the parties in cases 
assigned to them for trial.380 Because the discretion granted to judges for 
                                                                                                                     
The Eastern District of Tennessee, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 995, 1000 (1996); Kennedy, supra 
note 54, at 10; McKay, supra note 122, at 827; Peckham, supra note 1, at 789; Zampano, 
supra note 137, at 4. For some, this concern is limited to nonjury cases. See Baer, supra 
note 122, at 150–51; Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 25 (quoting Judge Klein); Will et 
al., supra note 53, at 211–12. 
 374 See, e.g., CRAVER, supra note 259, § 16.14(1); Alfini, supra note 119, at 11; 
Randall E. Butler, Ethics in Mediation: Protecting the Integrity of the Mediation Process, 
HOUS. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 40, 43–44; Frey, supra note 136, at 760; Killefer, supra 
note 169, at 21; Longan, supra note 126, at 738; Marcus, supra note 15, at 1593; Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 16, at 511; Resnik, supra note 1, at 435; Frank E.A. Sander, A 
Friendly Amendment, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11, 24; Schuck, supra note 158, at 
364; Tornquist, supra note 50, at 760; Susan M. Gabriel, Note, Judicial Participation in 
Settlement: Pattern, Practice, and Ethics, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 81, 91–92 (1988). 
But see Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1997 (2007). 
 375 See supra notes 260–68 and accompanying text. 
 376 See supra text accompanying notes 356–59. 
 377 Novak v. Farneman, No. 2:10-CV-768, 2011 WL 4688630, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 
30, 2011) (deciding that continuing to preside over disputes the judge had mediated did not 
pose a threat to impartiality and that recusal was not required, but nonetheless recusing 
himself to avoid any taint of suggested bias); Kearny v. Milwaukee County, No. 05-C-834, 
2007 WL 3171395, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 2007) (order of recusal) (magistrate judge 
recusing himself on his own initiative when assigned to try a case he had mediated); see 
also Day v. NLO, 864 F. Supp. 40, 41, 43–44 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (order transferring case) 
(disagreeing with the argument that a judge who participated in settlement is incapable of 
reviewing that settlement, but recusing himself “out of an abundance of caution”). 
 378 Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 24 (noting “considerable disagreement” among 
federal judges). 
 379 See, e.g., LACEY, supra note 44, at 23; Baer, supra note 122, at 148; Brazil 
Interview, supra note 153, at 27 (quoting Judge Klein); Hogan, supra note 129, at 439; 
Miller, supra note 128, at 33 (quoting Judge McCarthy); Polster, supra note 122; see also 
Martin, supra note 159, at 194–95 (describing a judge who conducts his own settlement 
conferences when he is the trier of fact). 
 380 Robinson, supra note 122, at 344 & tbl.2, 356 & tbl.6. Actual use of the practice 
was somewhat less prevalent. Practices were almost evenly split at the extremes on the 
general civil trial bench. About 38% of the judges reported that they were the trial judge in 
90% or more of their settlement conference cases, while almost 40% reported that they 
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pretrial management includes everything related to settlement (unless 
restricted by local rule), many judges are free to take on dual-neutral roles. 
And, as shown above, judges’ confidence in their ability to do this is 
understandable, even if misplaced.381  
In the federal court system, the ideal way to reduce the potential for 
coercion and partiality that can damage perceptions of civil justice—in the 
context of both settlement and adjudication—would be through amendments 
to Rule 16 that prevent judges from serving as settlement neutrals in cases 
assigned to them for management and adjudication. Separating these functions 
structurally would establish a uniform national approach and establish a norm 
that state court systems could adopt as well. This is, however, an ambitious 
proposal. It failed as an ethical reform, and any attempt to amend Rule 16 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will surely face similar challenges.  
One headwind the proposal will face is that it would impose limitations on 
judicial discretion, which was embraced by the Rules’ original drafters and is 
now particularly strong in the pretrial setting.382 While a general lack of 
constraint on judicial power has been one of the central criticisms of the 
discretion associated with judicial management,383 it should be clear by now 
that I am not urging reform from that perspective or seeking to curtail 
discretion as a general matter through procedural rules.384 The argument here 
is limited to settlement conferences. Professor Cooper, the long-serving 
Reporter for the Advisory Rules Committee, offered a pragmatic justification 
for discretion as “a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult — as it 
                                                                                                                     
were rarely assigned as the trial judge in their settlement conference cases (10% or less). 
Id. at 346 & tbl.5. Judges assigned to the family law bench, however, were more likely to 
conduct settlement conferences in cases to which they were assigned for trial. Id. at 347; 
see also Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., Nos. 00-1401 (PLF/JMF), 
00-2089 (PLF/JMF), 2010 WL 4116858, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (remarking that 
federal magistrate judges “are often called upon to try a case after they have presided over 
settlement discussions” in the District of Columbia). 
 381 See supra notes 314–18 and accompanying text. 
 382 See Gensler, supra note 9, at 720. See generally Marcus, supra note 15; Subrin, 
supra note 17. 
 383 See, e.g., Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the 
Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 44 (1995); Resnik, supra note 1, at 
380; Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 553 (2006).  
 384 The appropriate amount of discretion the rules should grant to judges is an 
important question that requires a delicate balance among many competing policies, among 
them simplicity, flexibility, uniformity, predictability, and the transsubstantive application 
of the rules. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 374, at 1963–64; Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1925, 1936–37 (1989) (criticizing aversion to substance-specific procedures that 
necessitates heavy reliance on judicial discretion); Gensler, supra note 9, at 720–26 
(summarizing scholarly criticism and defense of discretion); Richard Marcus, Confessions 
of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibilities of Perfecting Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. 
U. L. REV. 103, 116–19 (2007) (discussing tradeoffs among simplicity, predictability, 
tailoring, and divergent treatment). 
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almost always is — to foresee even the most important problems and to 
determine their wise resolution.”385 The problems with judges settling cases 
they manage and adjudicate are not, however, difficult to foresee. A decision 
to serve as a settlement neutral is unlike the many pretrial managerial 
decisions that require case-by-case tailoring or that benefit from judicial 
discretion to make adjustments from default provisions.386 Instead, policies 
governing the extent to which judges should mix conflicting neutral roles can 
be determined with reference to overarching principles coupled with practical 
considerations.387 
Perhaps the best hope is that federal rulemakers would regard an 
amendment as an opportunity to achieve national uniformity on an important 
issue by imposing a structural separation of neutral functions. As with prior 
changes to Rule 16’s provisions concerning settlement conferences, an 
amendment of this nature would not be breaking new ground. Although it 
would do much more than merely confirm the status quo, it would follow the 
lead of the districts with similar rules. Failing a uniform national approach, 
however, district courts could improve their local rules by coordinating their 
provisions for settlement conferences with those that govern their ADR 
programs. The framework suggested in this Article defines the issue as one of 
eliminating conflicting neutral roles rather than one of restricting judicial 
management. This conceptualization could provide a basis for revisions of 
local rules to bring provisions for judicial settlement conferences within 
accepted principles for ADR processes.  
1. Essentials for Separating Neutral Functions 
Two key elements need to be incorporated in an amendment. First, the rule 
should establish a structural separation by prohibiting judges assigned to 
adjudicate and manage a case from presiding at settlement. “Settlement” needs 
to encompass both judicial settlement conferences and mediations. This does 
not mean relieving judges from presiding over settlement conferences or 
serving as mediators, where they have much to offer.388 Separate settlement 
                                                                                                                     
 385 Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
1794, 1795 (2002). 
 386 As an example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit judges to vary the 
appropriate number and length of depositions depending on the circumstances of the case. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), 30(a)(2), 30(d)(1). 
 387 There are also other reasons to avoid undue optimism about the prospects of 
addressing the problem of dual-neutral roles via an amendment to Rule 16. In the words of 
Professor Marcus, Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
“Amendments do not and should not happen often. Amending the rules is not easy and 
should not be.” Richard Marcus, Shoes That Did Not Drop, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 
637 (2013). Moreover, sometimes a crisis mentality is necessary before procedural reform 
is undertaken. Richard L. Marcus, Modes of Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 157, 186 (2008). 
 388 See supra notes 158–76 and accompanying text.  
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judges are not impractical if courts assign this function to magistrate judges or 
use a “buddy system” in which judges trade cases for settlement. Courts could 
also use senior or retired judges as settlement judges.389  
Objectors sometimes envision a sharing system in which the assigned 
judge conducts the settlement proceeding and then, if it is not successful, 
transfers the case to another judge for trial. This could create administrative 
problems and would make it difficult to set a firm trial date as a method to 
encourage settlement.390 Reassigning the settlement process rather than the 
trial would mitigate these administrative barriers. And, given the 
decisionmaking that is involved in pretrial management, reassigning 
settlement better serves the goal of separating adjudicatory and settlement 
roles. Another objection to referring mediations to another judge is that the 
colleague will not welcome the case, which will consume time but not bolster 
his disposition statistics or lighten his docket.391 This administrative barrier 
could be remedied by adjusting the way statistics are gathered to account for 
settlements, and exchanging cases for settlement should even out the effect on 
the docket in the long run.  
Second, the rule should include a confidentiality provision to ensure that 
settlement judges and mediators may not report settlement communications to 
assigned judges.392 Because sometimes judges would like to know what 
happened during a settlement attempt in their case, it is important to limit 
disclosures from settlement conferences just as many districts limit such 
communication from their ADR programs. A provision could be modeled on 
the Uniform Mediation Act, the local federal court rules, or state rules 
discussed above.393  
2. Potential Exceptions 
If the rulemaking bodies do take up the issue of dual-neutral roles, there 
are two potential exceptions that will likely be urged to modify a bright-line 
rule. One is to limit the prohibition on dual-neutral roles to bench trials. The 
second is to allow exceptions when parties consent to the assigned judge 
serving as the settlement neutral. The first exception should be rejected. The 
second should be limited to very narrow circumstances.  
The Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct thought that 
ethical concerns about a dual judicial role are lessened when a judge presides 
                                                                                                                     
 389 One judge has even suggested reciprocal arrangements between federal- and state-
court judges. Cratsley, supra note 122, at 589. 
 390 Polster, supra note 122. 
 391 Baer, supra note 122, at 149. 
 392 See Welsh, supra note 126, at 990, 1028–32 (proposing strict confidentiality 
provisions to separate mediation from adjudication). 
 393 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 7(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003); see also supra Part 
IV.C.2. 
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over a jury trial.394 Consistent with this view, there are judges who consider 
their settlement efforts in cases assigned to them for adjudication as far less 
problematic in jury trials than in cases they will try from the bench.395 The 
reasoning behind this distinction is that, in a bench trial, the judge is the trier 
of fact and key witnesses may have participated in the mediation. In contrast, 
in a jury trial the judge’s role is only to manage the process while the jury 
decides the merits of the case.396 Thus the potential effect of settlement on 
decisionmaking is lessened with a jury trial. 
The arguments against making an exception for jury trials are twofold. 
First, while judges in a jury trial do not make the ultimate decision on the 
merits, they do make other crucial rulings during and after trial, and it is 
important to avoid any perception that these decisions have been influenced by 
settlement conversations.397 Decisions on motions to set aside a verdict or 
reduce the amount of damages awarded by a jury, for example, could be 
affected by a party’s concessions or the judge’s access to inadmissible 
evidence during settlement.398 Moreover, assigned judges make managerial 
decisions on discovery issues that might affect the value of a case in both jury 
and non-jury trials.399 
Second, a judge conducting a jury trial can influence a jury through her 
demeanor and nonverbal communication. Nonverbal signals are important in 
human communication and persuasion, and experimental work suggests that 
judges indicate their attitudes and respect for trial participants to the jury 
through facial expressions and body language.400 Jurors naturally look to 
judges for guidance during a trial, and studies of mock juries support a 
conclusion that not only are judges signaling their underlying views to jurors, 
but jurors are aware of these nonverbal cues from judges, particularly their 
negative behaviors.401 At the extreme, nonverbal judicial conduct has been 
                                                                                                                     
 394 Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 237, at 162. 
 395 See, e.g., Baer, supra note 122, at 150; Barnao, supra note 373, at 594–95; Brazil 
Interview, supra note 153, at 25 (quoting Judge Klein); Katz, supra note 135, at 3; Will et 
al., supra note 53, at 211–12; see also D. CONN. CIV. R. 16(c) (distinguishing assignment 
of neutral for bench and jury trials); D. HAW. R. 16.5 (same). 
 396 Polster, supra note 122, at n.2. 
 397 Cratsley, supra note 122, at 589 (discussing decisions about the jury empanelment 
process, evidentiary rulings, motions for directed verdict, and jury instructions); Killefer, 
supra note 169, at 19 (noting important effect of judges’ rulings on “the shape” of jury 
trial). 
 398 Barnao, supra note 373, at 595 n.87 (quoting Judge Levy). 
 399 Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 24 (quoting Judge Bremer discussing 
procedures in the District of Iowa to separate settlement from management functions). 
 400 See, e.g., Peter David Blanck et al., Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ 
Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 92 (1985). 
 401 Ann Burnett & Diane M. Badzinski, Judge Nonverbal Communication on Trial: Do 
Mock Trial Jurors Notice?, 55 J. COMM. 209, 209 (2005). 
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found to be reversible error.402 Even with more subtle effects, nonverbal 
signals are a reason to take seriously concerns about a judge who has led a 
settlement process presiding at a jury trial.  
The second potential exception is one that would allow an assigned judge 
to function as a settlement neutral with the consent of the parties. As with jury 
trials, party consent is a factor that the Judicial Conference’s Committee on 
Codes of Conduct thought should mitigate ethical concerns when an assigned 
judge leads settlement discussions.403 The ABA Section on Dispute Resolution 
ethical proposal would have permitted a trial judge to serve as a mediator with 
consent of the parties,404 and some judges have also voiced support for this 
approach.405 In addition, among the federal districts that generally do not 
permit an assigned judge to preside at a settlement conference, some permit an 
exception if the parties all stipulate their consent.406  
An exception for consent would be consistent with the emphasis in 
mediation on party self-determination407 and with the judicial codes’ 
permission for ex parte communications in settlement with the consent of the 
parties.408 Parties and their attorneys may prefer settlement with the judge 
assigned for management and trial based on that judge’s settlement skill and 
style, especially if there are few alternatives in a particular jurisdiction. 
Consent may also, however, implicate the tendency toward overconfidence. 
An attorney may be so confident that the judge will see her side of the case as 
stronger that she may undervalue the risks of settlement participation. In any 
event, consent should not be a matter of agreeing to a judge’s suggestion that 
she serve as the settlement judge; it should come entirely at the initiative of the 
parties. This is necessary in order to avoid the dilemma inherent in resisting a 
judicial request. In addition, if the case does not settle, the parties should have 
                                                                                                                     
 402 See e.g., Andrew Horwitz, Mixed Signals and Subtle Cues: Jury Independence and 
Judicial Appointment of the Jury Foreperson, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 829, 850–54 (2005) 
(discussing cases). 
 403 Advisory Opinion No. 95, supra note 237, at 161. 
 404 See SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 326. It would also have permitted 
the practice if there is no reasonable alternative, such as when a jurisdiction has only a 
single judge. Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 26. 
 405 Brazil Interview, supra note 153, at 25 (quoting Judge Klein emphasizing the 
importance of the parties’ wishes); Katz, supra note 135, at 3 (describing a judge willing to 
participate in mediation in cases scheduled for bench trial when parties so request and 
waive the conflict). The survey of California judges that asked about dual-neutral roles 
premised the question on party consent. Robinson, supra note 122, at 343; see also supra 
text accompanying note 380. 
 406 See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 240(a)(16), 270(b); N.D. CAL. ADR R. 7-2; D. GUAM R. 16-
2(b)(1)(B); D. HAW. R. 16.5(a); D.N.D. R. 16.2(C)(1) (“appropriate jury case[s]” only); see 
also D. OR. R. 16-4(e)(2) (parties must “jointly initiate a request”); M.D. TENN. R. 16.04(a) 
(exception when “requested and agreed by the parties” or if the assigned judge deems it 
appropriate “because of the exigencies of the case”).  
 407 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard 1 (AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N ET AL. 2005) (self-determination).  
 408 See supra text accompanying notes 331–34. 
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the option to reevaluate their consent after the settlement attempt, when they 
will know what information they shared with the judge. At that point, they will 
be better able to evaluate the risk of partiality on the part of the judge.409  
V. CONCLUSION 
Concerns about bias and coercion have accompanied judicial settlement 
from its inception. Both these concerns are greatly heightened when a judge 
serves as a neutral in a case she is also managing and will adjudicate if 
settlement is unsuccessful. Forceful encouragement to settle becomes coercion 
when it comes from a person with decisionmaking power over the case. 
Impartiality at trial is threatened by the information shared with the judge in 
settlement or, alternatively, the settlement process is made less effective by 
withholding that information. The rise of facilitative mediation as a judicial 
settlement method may help reduce worries about coercion, but it heightens 
concerns about impartiality because of the types of information that pass from 
parties to the decisionmaker. And due to advances in cognitive and social 
psychology, a greater understanding of mental processes and decisionmaking 
supports and sharpens these concerns.  
The perception of these problems by parties and attorneys is as important 
as the reality. Settlement has become an important judicial function, identified 
with the courts, and the way it is conducted will influence how the public 
views the integrity of the judicial system. It is time to move beyond the 
conception of a managerial judge as someone who handles all the pretrial 
matters in a case, including settlement. Presiding at settlement is, at its core, a 
neutral role, not a managerial function. Judges make significant contributions 
as settlement neutrals, and the risks inherent in dual neutral roles can be 
avoided by imposing a structural separation between settlement and 
adjudication. Rules that leave true settlement management in the hands of the 
assigned judge, while reassigning the settlement neutral function to a judge 
who is not responsible for adjudication, would enhance the effectiveness of 
settlement and protect the integrity of courts’ decisionmaking processes. 
                                                                                                                     
 409 Cf. Welsh, supra note 126, at 990, 1032–33 (proposing that when a single 
magistrate judge presides over both settlement and adjudication, caucuses should be barred 
in the settlement session and the parties should be able to elect, after the settlement session, 
whether or not the magistrate judge will conduct the trial). 
